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ABSTRACT 
Scholars praise the whistleblower protections of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 as one of the most protective anti-retaliation provisions in 
the world.  Yet, during its first three years, only 3.6% of Sarbanes-
Oxley whistleblowers won relief through the initial administrative 
process that adjudicates such claims, and only 6.5% of whistleblowers 
won appeals through the process.  This Article reports the results of an 
empirical study of all Department of Labor Sarbanes-Oxley 
determinations during this time, consisting of over 700 separate 
decisions from administrative investigations and hearings.  The results 
of this detailed analysis demonstrate that administrative decision-
makers strictly construed, and in some cases misapplied, Sarbanes-
Oxley’s substantive protections to the significant disadvantage of 
employees.  These data-based findings assist in identifying the 
provisions and procedures of the Act that do not work as Congress 
intended as well as suggest potential remedies for these statutory and 
administrative deficiencies. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Whistleblowers played a significant role in revealing and disrupting 
corporate malfeasance at the beginning of the 21st Century, as scandals at 
corporations such as Enron and WorldCom came to public light through 
the efforts of whistleblowing employees.1 Subsequently, Congress recog-
nized the importance of whistleblowing and included strong and 
unprecedented anti-retaliation protection for corporate employees as part 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the mammoth Congressional reaction 
to these corporate scandals.2
Yet, in the first three years after the statute’s enactment, the Act 
failed to protect the vast majority of employees who filed a Sarbanes-
Oxley retaliation claim.  During this time, 491 employees filed Sarbanes-
Oxley complaints with the Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion (OSHA), the agency charged with initially investigating such 
complaints.3 OSHA resolved 361 of these cases, and found for employees 
 
1 See Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model to Encourage Corporate 
Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1117-19, 1123-24 (2006) (describing successful 
whistleblowing efforts). 
2 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 806, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Supp. 2004). 
3 See Table 3 infra Part IV.A. 
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only 13 times, a win rate of 3.6%.4 On appeal from 93 OSHA decisions, 
Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) in the Department of Labor found in 
favor of 6 employees, a win rate of 6.5%.5
This Article presents the findings of an empirical analysis of these 
Sarbanes-Oxley administrative decisions to explore why the Act’s protec-
tions did not produce a robust number of employee victories.  The results 
indicate that employees rarely won claims for two primary reasons.  First, 
OSHA and the ALJs generally decided cases as a matter of law and rig-
idly construed Sarbanes-Oxley’s legal requirements.6 Second, for cases 
that survived this strict legal scrutiny during the initial OSHA investiga-
tion, OSHA tended to misapply Sarbanes-Oxley’s burden of proof to the 
detriment of employees.7
These findings challenge the hope of scholars and whistleblower ad-
vocates that Sarbanes-Oxley’s legal boundaries and burden of proof 
would often result in favorable outcomes for whistleblowers.  For exam-
ple, soon after the Act’s enactment, Professor Robert Vaughn asserted 
that the statute “may be the most important whistleblower protection law 
in the world.”8 Tom Devine, the legal director for the Government Ac-
countability Project, a whistleblower advocacy group, described the Act 
as “the promised land . . . .  [T]he law represents a revolution in corporate 
freedom of speech [that] far surpasses, indeed laps, the rights available 
for government workers.”9 Taxpayers Against Fraud called the statute 
“the single most effective measure possible to prevent recurrences of the 
Enron debacle and similar threats to the nation’s financial markets.”10 
The language of Sarbanes-Oxley’s anti-retaliation protections justi-
fied this initial reaction.  Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, millions of workers 
were protected from retaliation for revealing corporate wrongdoing only 
sporadically, if at all.11 The Act now purports to protect these workers by 
providing significant remedies for retaliation against corporate whistle-
 
4 See Table 1 infra Part IV.A. 
5 See id. 
6 See discussion infra Part IV.B.2. 
7 See discussion infra Part IV.B.3. 
8 Robert G. Vaughn, America’s First Comprehensive Statute Protecting Corporate Whis-
tleblowers, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 105 (2005); see also STEPHEN M. KOHN, ET AL., 
WHISTLEBLOWER LAW xii (2004) (labeling Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower provision “the 
most systematic whistleblower protection framework enacted into federal law”); Cynthia 
Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUMBIA L. 
REV. 319, 376 (2005) (calling the provision the “gold standard” of whistleblower protec-
tion); but see Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers, and 
the Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1029, 1034 
(2004) (concluding that Sarbanes-Oxley is a “half-measure” and not the true reform that 
securities law needs to respond to corporate fraud).   
9 Blowing the Whistle on Corporate Wrongdoing: An Interview with Tom Devine, 23 MUL-
TINATIONAL MONITOR (2002), available at http://multinationalmonitor.org/mm2002/02oct-
nov/octno02interviewdevine. html.  Additionally, Gregory Watchman, the Executive 
Director of the Government Accountability Project, characterized the provisions as a 
“major breakthrough in establishing whistleblower rights.”  Gregory R. Watchman, 
Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers: A New Corporate Early Warning System, at 8 (Nov. 2004), 
available at http://www.whistleblower.org/doc/GAP%20Analysis%20 Sarbanes%2DO 
xley%2Epdf.   
10 S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 10 (2002). 
11 See infra text accompanying notes 32-36; Vaughn, supra note 8, at 11-12. 
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blowers, including non-economic damages and reinstatement.12 More-
over, the Congressionally-mandated burden of proof under Sarbanes-
Oxley favors employees more than most employment protections.13 
Indeed, a few early victories for employees sparked outrage from man-
agement attorneys, who argued that Sarbanes-Oxley’s protections were 
too broad and overly burdensome for employers14—a sign that perhaps 
the Act provided real protections for whistleblowers. 
Despite Sarbanes-Oxley’s pro-whistleblower provisions and a few 
early employee victories, however, administrative decisions over the first 
three years of the Act’s life failed to fulfill Congress’ expectation that a 
strong anti-retaliation provision would both encourage and protect whis-
tleblowers.  This Article explains why.   
Part II of the Article provides a brief summary of Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
substantive and procedural requirements.  Part III summarizes the scope 
and methodology of my empirical study examining why employees 
rarely won Sarbanes-Oxley cases.  This study examined all Department of 
Labor Sarbanes-Oxley cases filed and resolved during the first three years 
of Sarbanes-Oxley’s existence, totaling over 700 separate decisions from 
two levels of administrative investigations and hearings.  As explained in 
Part III, the scope of this study differs from previous empirical studies of 
employment cases in two fundamental ways.  First, rather than rely only 
on published decisions to comprise a sample of examined cases,15 this 
 
12 See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c) (Supp. 2004). 
13 To prove a prima facie case of retaliation under Sarbanes-Oxley, employees must 
demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that retaliation for engaging in protected 
activity was a “contributing” factor to their adverse employment action.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 50-52.  To rebut a prima facie case, an employer must show by clear 
and convincing evidence that it would have made the same employment decision in the 
absence of any employee protected activity.  See id. 
14 See Cathleen Flahardy, SOX Gives DOL Power to Reinstate Whistleblowers: Employers 
Struggle to Defend Themselves Against Wrongful Termination Claims, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 
2005, at 24 (stating that one ALJ employee win demonstrates “how difficult it will be for 
companies to prove their cases in whistleblower suits under Sarbanes-Oxley”); Mary E. 
Pivec, Whistleblower Protection Pitfalls: Innocent Companies are Drained in Defending Adverse-
Action Claims, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 18, 2005, at 28; Michael Starr & Adam J. Heft, Whistle-
blower Protections and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, N.Y. L.J., April 4, 2005, at 12 (discussing three 
early ALJ decisions in favor of the employee and concluding that “[b]ased on these [early] 
decisions, SOX may reach a broader range of conduct and provide a more potent array of 
remedies than most employers had anticipated.”).  Two management attorney commenta-
tors concluded that one ALJ decision in favor of an employee “looms as a foreboding 
omnipresence to employers who were hoping for a restrictive interpretation” of Sarbanes-
Oxley.  See Starr & Heft, supra, at 12; see also John B. Chiara & Michael D. Orenstein, Note: 
Whistler’s Nocturne in Black and Gold-The Falling Rocket: Why the Sarbanes-Oxley Whistle-
blower Provision Falls Short of the Mark, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 235, 267 (2005) 
(“Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblowers have an easier time gaining protection than do em-
ployees under other whistleblower acts. . . . [W]hat remains to be seen is whether the 
employer has been placed in too vulnerable a position.”). 
15 See, e.g., Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants,
34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 103-04 (1999) [hereinafter Windfall]; Ruth Colker, Winning 
and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 244 (2001) [herein-
after Winning]; Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 548, 556 (2001); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An 
Empirical Study of California Employment Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge Jury Verdicts 
Reveals Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 511, 532 (2003); 
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study collected all administrative decisions involving Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
anti-retaliation provision.  Data from this census of cases allows stronger 
inferences than data derived from a sample of published cases.16 Second, 
some previous employment law studies relied upon data collected by the 
government; while such data sets contain a large number of cases, analy-
ses usually produce only general outcome or procedural data about each 
case.17 By contrast, this study involved in-depth coding of decisions to 
obtain detailed data that permitted nuanced analyses of the rationales 
provided by decision-makers in their determinations.18 The breadth of 
data produced by a census of cases and the depth of data resulting from 
the coding process permitted a truly comprehensive analysis of Sarbanes-
Oxley’s administrative decisions. 
Part IV of the Article presents the study’s results.  The first section 
describes the low employee win rate at the two different levels of admin-
istrative review—the initial investigation conducted by OSHA and any 
subsequent hearing before an ALJ.  The second section analyzes the 
rationales OSHA and the ALJs provided when finding for the employer 
and examines whether the employee lost because (1) the employee vio-
lated a “procedural” rule, such as the statute of limitations; (2) the 
employee’s claim failed as a matter of law for not fitting within Sarbanes-
Oxley’s legal “boundaries”; or (3) the decision-maker determined that the 
case did not have sufficient “factual” merit, e.g., that the employee’s 
whistleblowing caused any adverse employment action.   
The analysis in Part IV provides two explanations for Sarbanes-
Oxley’s low employee win rate.  First, employees frequently lost because 
OSHA and the ALJs determined that a large number of employees either 
violated a procedural rule or did not meet Sarbanes-Oxley’s statutory 
requirements as a matter of law.  Thus, OSHA and the ALJs rejected a 
large percentage of cases (71.0% for OSHA, 95.2% for ALJs) for failing to 
fit within the exact legal parameters of a Sarbanes-Oxley claim, thereby 
avoiding any determination of the factual merits of an employee’s allega-
tions.19 This strict legal scrutiny may have many causes; I posit that it 
likely resulted from the push and pull of defining a new statute’s bounda-
ries.  Employees, perhaps relying on expectations generated by scholars 
and whistleblower advocates, brought claims that tested the boundaries 
of this new statute.  Administrative decision-makers responded by inter-
preting ambiguous provisions of the statute narrowly. 
Second, for the few cases that survived this strict scrutiny (meaning 
that a decision-maker determined that the case fell within the legal 
“boundaries” of a Sarbanes-Oxley claim), employees often lost because 
OSHA misapplied Sarbanes-Oxley’s burden of proof.  Despite a burden 
 
Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 889, 897-99 (2006).  
16 See discussion infra Part III. 
17 See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination 
Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMP. L. STUD. 429, 429-30 (2004); Laura Beth Nielsen & 
Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? An Empirical Analysis of Employment Discrimination 
Litigation as a Claiming System, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 663, 687-701 (2005). 
18 See discussion infra Part III. 
19 See discussion supra Part IV.B.1. 
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of proof clearly favorable to employees, OSHA decided in favor of the 
employee in only 12.1% of the cases in which it evaluated the factual 
merits of an employee’s allegations.  By contrast, when ALJs adjudicated 
the facts of a whistleblower claim, employees won 55.6% of the time.  I 
suggest that OSHA’s regulations and budgetary restraints contributed to 
its failure to apply Sarbanes-Oxley’s burden of proof appropriately. 
In Part V, based on the findings of this study, I offer suggestions for 
statutory changes and interpretations that would better reflect Congress’ 
goals of protecting whistleblowers and remedying retaliation.  First, fully 
one-third of all employees who lost at the ALJ Level and 18% who lost at 
the OSHA Level lost because the employee failed to satisfy Sarbanes-
Oxley’s short 90-day statute of limitations.20 Because this procedural 
issue has little to do with the substantive merits of the whistleblower’s 
claim, I suggest extending this statute of limitations to a minimum of 180 
days.21 This extension will make the Act’s limitations period similar to 
those found in equivalent whistleblower protections statutes and also 
should provide a more reasonable period of time for whistleblowers to 
file complaints. 
Second, when OSHA and the ALJs interpreted certain provisions of 
the Act that define the legal “boundaries” of the Act’s coverage, these 
administrative decision-makers strictly examined two areas in particular: 
whether the Respondent was a “covered employer” and whether the 
employee engaged in “protected activity.”  Part V recommends statutory 
changes that could be implemented to address the overly-rigid adminis-
trative scrutiny in these two areas.22 For example, Sarbanes-Oxley 
currently applies only to employees of publicly-traded corporations.  I 
recommend that the Act apply to employers with a specific number of 
employees, which would clarify the Act’s applicability by importing a 
well-known standard from other employee protection statutes.  Further-
more, I suggest amending the scope of an employee’s “protected 
activity.”  The Act currently protects only employees who disclose ille-
galities related to six specific areas of federal law.  I suggest amending the 
Act to protect whistleblowers who report any unlawful activity by their 
employer.  Alternatively, I suggest that OSHA and the Office of Adminis-
trative Law Judges publicize and disseminate certain statistical and 
substantive information about Sarbanes-Oxley cases in order to clarify 
their interpretations of the Act’s legal protections and to moderate any 
bias toward a particular party. 
Third, the Act’s employee-friendly burden of proof needs to be revi-
talized by altering OSHA’s investigative procedures and providing 
OSHA more investigative resources.23 As an alternative, I suggest remov-
ing OSHA from its current investigative role and replacing OSHA’s 
process with one of three substitutes: permitting whistleblowers to file 
claims directly in federal court; beginning the Sarbanes-Oxley administra-
tive process with hearings before an ALJ rather than with an OSHA 
 
20 See Table 4 infra Part IV.B. 
21 See discussion infra Part V.A. 
22 See discussion infra Part V.B. 
23 See discussion infra Part V.C. 
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investigation; or giving OSHA’s investigative responsibilities to another 
agency, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission.24 Any of these 
options could address OSHA’s current misapplication of the Act’s burden 
of proof scheme. 
Ultimately, Sarbanes-Oxley failed to fulfill the great expectations 
generated by the Act’s purportedly-strong anti-retaliation protections.  
Examining the reasons for this failure can provide insight to improve the 
Act.  Specifically, the results suggest an urgent need for a legislative and 
administrative reevaluation of Sarbanes-Oxley’s anti-retaliation provi-
sion.  The under-enforcement of this provision undermines Congress’ 
policy goal of deterring corporate fraud and leaves literally millions of 
private-sector employees vulnerable to retaliation.  Moreover, the study’s 
findings can provide general lessons for the drafters of future whistle-
blower protection efforts and should serve as a reminder of the difficulty 
of transferring the idealistic legislative goal of broad employee protection 
into realistic rights and attainable remedies.  
II. SARBANES-OXLEY’S WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS: A SHORT 
OVERVIEW 
In Congressional hearings investigating the stunning collapse of En-
ron in 2002, whistleblower Sherron Watkins revealed crucial details 
regarding Enron’s fraudulent activities.25 In later hearings regarding 
WorldCom’s subsequent collapse, testimony from WorldCom officers 
demonstrated that an internal auditor named Cynthia Cooper discovered 
the massive fraud orchestrated by the company‘s Chief Financial Officer 
and reported it to the board of directors.26 Given the importance of such 
employee disclosures, Congress considered it necessary to break the 
“corporate code of silence” that discouraged potential whistleblowers 
from coming forward.27 Accordingly, Sarbanes-Oxley contains several 
provisions aimed at encouraging employees to disclose information about 
corporate wrongdoing.   
First, and most prominently,28 Congress created an anti-retaliation 
provision to protect whistleblowers from adverse employment actions.29 
24 See id. 
25 See The Financial Collapse of Enron—Part 3: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight 
and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 107th Cong. 14–66 (2002) 
(testimony of Sherron Watkins). 
26 See Statement of John W. Sidgmore, Pres. & CEO, WorldCom, Inc. Before the Committee 
on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, at 2 (July 8, 2002), available at 
http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/worldcom/ 70802jstst.pdf. 
27 S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 4-5 (2002). 
28 With regard to whistleblower encouragement, academic and public attention has 
focused primarily on Sarbanes-Oxley’s anti-retaliation provisions. See, e.g., KOHN, ET AL., 
supra note 8; Leonard M. Baynes, Just Pucker and Blow?: An Analysis of Corporate Whistle-
blowers, the Duty of Care, the Duty of Loyalty, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
875 (2002); Cherry, supra note 8; Vaughn, supra note 8; Ashlea Ebeling, Blowing the Sar-
banes-Oxley Whistle, FORBES.COM (June 18, 2003), available at 
http://www.forbes.com/2003/06/18/ cx_ae_0618beltway_print.html.     
29 The anti-retaliation provision is Section 806 of the Corporate and Criminal Fraud 
Accountability Act, which was included as Title VIII of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.  
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Supp. 2004). 
UNFULFILLED EXPECTATIONS 
8
Second, Sarbanes-Oxley also contains criminal penalties for individuals 
who retaliate against employees who “blow the whistle” to law enforce-
ment authorities about violations of federal law.30 Third, the Act requires 
that corporations create a whistleblower disclosure channel for employ-
ees to report misconduct anonymously to the corporate board of 
directors.31 This Article focuses on Sarbanes-Oxley’s anti-retaliation 
provision. 
A. The Anti-Retaliation Protections of the Act 
Congress viewed the anti-retaliation protections as particularly im-
portant because, at the time, federal and state laws failed to protect 
employees consistently if they reported corporate malfeasance.  Rather, 
corporate whistleblowers were “subject to the patchwork and vagaries of 
current state laws, although most publicly traded companies do business 
nationwide.”32 Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, protections for whistleblowers 
varied by the state in which the employee worked33 and the type of re-
taliation which the employee endured.34 Federal law protected only 
whistleblowers who reported certain types of violations in certain indus-
tries.35 Thus, employees had difficulty predicting whether  they would be 
protected from retaliation as a result of reporting wrongdoing.  Needless 
to say, this difficulty discouraged employees from consistently coming 
forward with information.36 
The protections of Sarbanes-Oxley’s anti-retaliation provision pur-
port to address some of these problems.  First, to address the “patchwork 
of state laws,” Sarbanes-Oxley applies nationally to employees of all 
publicly-traded companies.  The Act’s coverage extends beyond a par-
ticular industry and reaches all companies that issue publicly-traded 
shares.37 
30 See id. § 1107, 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (Supp. 2004). 
31 See id. § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(4)(A) (Supp. 2004); see generally Moberly, supra 
note 1 (analyzing this provision as a method of encouraging whistleblowers).  
32 S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 10 (2002). 
33 States vary widely in the type of protections they provide.  Some states, like 
Georgia, provide little protection to employee whistleblowers.  See GA. CODE ANN. § 34-7-1 
(2005) (at-will employment provision); Goodroe v. Ga. Power Co., 251 S.E.2d 51, 52 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1978) (finding that Georgia’s employment-at-will statute permitted employer to 
fire employee because employee was about to uncover criminal activities).  Others, like 
New Jersey, have a broad reaching statute protecting any whistleblower who reports any 
violation of law. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19 (2005).  As Congress noted, “a whistleblowing 
employee in one state may be far more vulnerable to retaliation than a fellow employee in 
another state who takes the same actions.”  S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 10 (2002). 
34 Some laws protect employees only if they are discharged and do not address 
other forms of retaliation.  See, e.g., White v. State, 929 P.2d 396, 407 (Wash. 1997) (limiting 
retaliation suit to cases in which employee was actually or constructively discharged).  
35 See, e.g., STEPHEN M. KOHN, CONCEPTS AND PROCEDURES IN WHISTLEBLOWER LAW 79-
80 (2001); MARCIA P. MICELI & JANET P. NEAR, BLOWING THE WHISTLE: THE ORGANIZATIONAL 
AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPANIES AND EMPLOYEES 233-34 (1992). 
36 See Martin H. Malin, Protecting the Whistleblower from Retaliatory Discharge, 17  U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 277, 286 (1983). 
37 The Act applies to any “company with a class of securities registered under sec-
tion 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 781), or that is required to file 
reports under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78o(d)).”  18 
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Second, to correct the lack of protection for employees who report 
the type of securities fraud and accounting irregularities that led to the 
corporate scandals, Sarbanes-Oxley specifically protects employees who 
engage in protected activity related to fraud.  To be protected, the subject 
matter of the whistleblower’s report must relate to violations of one of six 
different types of laws, many of which are related to securities or ac-
counting fraud.38 The breadth of protected activity related to that topic 
actually could be quite expansive.39 Employees are protected if they 
“provide information, cause information to be provided, or otherwise 
assist in an investigation regarding” such violations.40 Further, the whis-
tleblower does not need to report an actual violation of the law; rather, 
the employee must “reasonably believe” that a violation occurred.41 The 
employee can provide information to any one of numerous recipients: a 
federal regulatory or law enforcement agency; any Member of any com-
mittee of Congress; or a person with “supervisory authority” over the 
whistleblower.42 The Act protects a whistleblower who files, causes to be 
filed, testifies, participates in, or otherwise assists in a proceeding related 
to violations of the same laws and regulations.43 
Finally, the remedies for a violation of the Act seem appropriately set 
to discourage retaliation.  OSHA may immediately reinstate a whistle-
blower if an initial OSHA investigation finds reasonable cause to believe 
retaliation occurred.44 In addition to the standard back-pay award, whis-
tleblowers also receive special damages, including attorneys’ fees, 
litigation costs, and expert witness fees.45 
B. The Procedure for Filing a Whistleblower Complaint 
Congress specifically incorporated into Sarbanes-Oxley the proce-
dural rules of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act 
 
U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (Supp. 2004).  The Act also applies to any “officer, employee, contractor, 
subcontractor, or agent of such company.”  See id. 
38 The statute protects activity related to violations of sections 1341 (mail fraud); 
1343 (wire fraud); 1344 (bank fraud); and 1348 (securities fraud) of Title 18 of the U.S. 
Code, or “any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any 
provision of Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders.”  Id. § 1514A(a)(1); see also 
id. § (a)(2). 
39 See Vaughn, supra note 8, at 22-50 (discussing broad readings of Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
statutory language); see also discussion infra Part V.B (supporting a broad reading of this 
language). 
40 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (Supp. 2004). 
41 See id. This standard is more protective of employees than other courts and stat-
utes that require a whistleblowing employee to be correct in their disclosure of illegal 
activity.  See, e.g., DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1992); Bordell v. 
General Elec. Co., 667 N.E.2d 922 (N.Y. 1996). 
42 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (Supp. 2004). 
43 Id. § 1514A(a)(2). 
44 See id. § 1514A(c)(2)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1980.105(a)(1) (2006); see also Vaughn, supra 
note 8, at 94 n.400 (noting benefits of reinstatement as a remedy). 
45 See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2)(B) & (C) (Supp. 2004); see also KOHN, supra note 8, at 
111 (noting that Sarbanes-Oxley is one of only four federal statutes that permit recovery of 
attorney fees as part of “special damages” that must be awarded, as opposed to as part of 
a fee-shifting scheme that gives courts discretion to deny the payment of reasonable 
attorneys’ fees to an employee). 
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for the 21st Century,46 also known as “AIR21,” which provides whistle-
blower protection for employees who report airline safety problems.47 
Consequently, Congress charged OSHA with the responsibility for inves-
tigating Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower complaints.48 Subsequent to the 
passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, OSHA issued specific regulations that detail 
the procedure for such whistleblower claims and that, for the most part, 
mirror AIR21’s procedures.49
After an employee files a complaint with OSHA, the agency informs 
the named Respondents and the SEC of the allegation.50 OSHA will 
dismiss the complaint without any investigation, under two conditions.  
First, OSHA will dismiss complaints that do not make a prima facie show-
ing of retaliation that: (1) the employee engaged in protected activity; 
(2) the employer knew about the activity; (3) the employee suffered an 
unfavorable personnel action; and (4) the “circumstances were sufficient 
to raise the inference that the protected activity was a contributing factor 
in the unfavorable action.”51 Second, if an inference of retaliation can be 
drawn, then OSHA will dismiss a complaint if the employer demon-
strates by clear and convincing evidence that the adverse employment 
action would have been taken regardless of the protected activity.52 The 
employer has twenty days from receiving notice of the complaint to 
provide statements or documents presenting its position.53
If an employee presents a prima facie case and the employer fails to 
meet its clear and convincing burden of proof, then OSHA will conduct 
an investigation.54 The regulations require OSHA to issue written find-
ings from the investigation within 60 days of the filing of the complaint 
 
46 Pub. L. No. 106-181, 114 Stat. 61 (Apr. 5, 2000) (codified in scattered sections of 49 
U.S.C.). 
47 See id.; 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 2004) (providing that, with few excep-
tions, Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower actions “shall be governed under the rules and 
procedures set forth in section 42121(b) of title 49, United States Code”). 
48 Commentators initially questioned whether OSHA, an agency mainly responsible 
for workplace safety, could adequately investigate claims involving “complex matters of 
corporate securities laws and other financial and accountancy laws and practices.”  
Procedures for the Handling of Discrimination Complaints Under Section 806 of the 
Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, Title VIII of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 [hereinafter Procedures], 69 Fed. Reg. 52104, 52104 (Aug. 24, 2004); see also 
Cherry, supra note 8, at 1083 n.383 (questioning the choice of OSHA as Sarbanes-Oxley 
investigative agency).  OSHA defended the choice by noting that it administers thirteen 
other whistleblower statutes, all of which involve protecting whistleblowers. See Proce-
dures, supra, at 52104-05. 
49 See generally Procedures, supra note 48, at 52104-52117. 
50 See 29 C.F.R. § 1980.104 (2006).  The regulations delegate the authority to investi-
gate and issue determinations regarding Sarbanes-Oxley claims to OSHA’s Assistant 
Secretary.  See Secretary’s Order 5-2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 65008 (Oct. 22, 2002).  In the follow-
ing description of Sarbanes-Oxley’s procedural regulations, I use the convenient (and 
intuitive) term “OSHA” rather than “Assistant Secretary,” which is used by the regula-
tions, because the Assistant Secretary is acting on behalf of the agency.   
51 See 29 C.F.R. § 1980.104 (2006).   
52 See id. 
53 See id. 
54 See 29 C.F.R. § 1980.104 (2006).
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regarding whether it finds reasonable cause to believe that retaliation in 
violation of the Act occurred.55 
If OSHA finds reasonable cause to believe that a violation occurred, 
then OSHA “shall” also issue a preliminary order of relief to the em-
ployee.  This order “shall” include “all relief necessary to make the 
employee whole, including, where appropriate: reinstatement with the 
same seniority status that the employee would have had but for the 
discrimination; back pay with interest; and compensation for any special 
damages sustained as a result of the discrimination, including litigation 
costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable attorney’s fees.”56 OSHA may 
order reinstatement to begin immediately, even if the employer requests 
further review of the order.57 Although such orders appear mandatory 
given the use of the term “shall,” the regulations provide that reinstate-
ment may not be appropriate if the employer demonstrates that the 
employee is a “security risk.”58 Of course, if reasonable cause is not 
found, then OSHA simply will notify the parties of that finding.59 
The parties have thirty days to request further review from an Ad-
ministrative Law Judge; otherwise, OSHA’s initial findings and order will 
become the final order of the Department of Labor.60 If a hearing is re-
quested, then an ALJ conducts a de novo hearing regarding the 
complaint.61 ALJs have broad discretion regarding the extent of discov-
ery permitted and the type of evidence allowed.62 
Appeals from an ALJ decision must be made within ten days of the 
decision to the Department of Labor’s Administrative Review Board 
(ARB).63 The ARB has discretion to take the case for review; if it has not 
done so within thirty days of the decision, then the ALJ’s decision will 
become the final determination of the agency.64 The ARB reviews the 
ALJ’s determination under the “substantial evidence” standard, and has 
120 days from the conclusion of the ALJ hearing to issue a final decision.65 
Appeals from an ARB decision are made to a federal circuit court of 
appeals.66 
Finally, the Act gives whistleblowers the option of filing a claim in 
federal court.  Sarbanes-Oxley permits employees (not employers) to 
remove the case to federal district court if the Department of Labor does 
not completely resolve a complaint within 180 days, including a decision 
by the ARB if appropriate.67 This option almost certainly will be available 
for employees, because it is unlikely that the entire process will be com-
 
55 See id. § 1980.105. 
56 Id. 
57 See id. 
58 Id. 
59 See id. 
60 See id. § 1980.106(b)(2). 
61 See id. § 1980.107(b). 
62 See id. §§ 1980.107(c); (d). 
63 See id. § 1980.110. 
64 See id. § 1980.110(b). 
65 See id. § 1980.110(b); (c). 
66 See id. § 1980.112(a). 
67 See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(B) (Supp. 2004).     
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pleted in that period of time: in Fiscal Year 2005, the initial OSHA inves-
tigation itself took an average of 127 days to complete.68 
As written, Sarbanes-Oxley appears to provide strong substantive 
and procedural protections for whistleblowers.  The Act includes favor-
able provisions for whistleblowers to file claims easily, to benefit from a 
favorable burden of proof, to obtain immediate reinstatement, and to file 
in federal court if desired.  Why, then, did so few employees win during 
the first three years of the Act’s existence?  The purpose of the present 
study was to empirically analyze OSHA and ALJ decisions to discover 
patterns of decision-making that, at least in part, answer this question. 
III. STUDY METHODOLOGY 
This section summarizes the study’s methodology,69 which differs 
from previous empirical studies of employment law decisions in areas 
such as sexual harassment,70 the Americans with Disabilities Act,71 race 
discrimination,72 general employment discrimination cases in federal 
court,73 and California jury verdicts in employment discrimination and 
wrongful discharge cases74. These studies obtained their data either by 
examining published judicial decisions75 (the “Westlaw” approach) or by 
utilizing an outcome database managed by a federal agency76 (the “Data-
base” approach).  Professors Kevin Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg 
describe these methods as the two most commonly employed of the three 
types of empirical legal studies currently being conducted.77 Professors 
Clermont and Eisenberg, however, reserve their highest praise for the 
third type of empirical study they identify—a study in which researchers 
 
68 See E-mail from Nilgun Tolek, Director, OSHA Office of Investigative Assistance, 
to Richard Moberly, Asst. Prof. of Law, Univ. of Neb. College of Law (Feb. 15, 2006) (on 
file with author).  This time period has grown significantly longer since the enactment of 
OSHA: in Fiscal Year 2003, the average length of a Sarbanes-Oxley investigation was 92 
days.  See id.; see also Allen v. Stewart Enterp., No. 05-059 (ARB Aug. 17, 2005), at 3 n.5 
(noting that employees dismissed their appeal in order to file in federal district court and 
stating that “[a]s is the usual case, the 180-day period for deciding the case had expired 
before the employees filed their petition with the Board”).   
69 A more detailed description of the study’s methodology can be found at the au-
thor’s website: http://law.unl.edu/inside.asp?d=faculty&id=28. 
70 See Juliano & Schwab, supra note 15, at 549-50. 
71 See Colker, Windfall, supra note 15, at 103-04; Colker, Winning, supra note 15, at 
244. 
72 See Parker, supra note 15, at 893. 
73 See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 17, at 429; Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 17, at 
664.  
74 See Oppenheimer, supra note 15, at 538. 
75 See, e.g., Colker, Windfall, supra note 15, at 103-04 (utilizing Westlaw to find pub-
lished opinions); Colker, Winning, supra note 15, at 244 (Westlaw); Juliano & Schwab, supra 
note 15, at 556 (utilizing Westlaw to find published opinions); Oppenheimer, supra note 
15, at 532 (utilizing California jury verdict reporters); Parker, supra note 15, at 897-99 
(Westlaw).  
76 See, e.g., Clermont & Schwab, supra note 17, at 429-30 (utilizing Administrative Of-
fice data); Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 17, at 687-91 (utilizing EEOC statistics); id. at 692-
701 (utilizing Administrative Office data). 
77 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. 
REV. 119, 125-26 (2002). 
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gather their own dataset from original sources for subsequent statistical 
analysis.78 The study presented in this Article follows this third, and less 
well-traveled, path described by Professors Clermont and Eisenberg.  
Although more labor intensive, the third path offers significant advan-
tages over the other two methods.   
Complete Census vs. Sampling. First, this study evaluates “broader“ 
data than typically mined by the Westlaw approach.  The Westlaw 
method can produce nuanced descriptive data if researchers follow social 
science methods of coding and analyzing the cases.79 However, the data 
comes from a narrow pool of cases, because the cases available on a 
database such as Westlaw represent a non-representative fraction of the 
cases actually decided by agencies and courts.80 This well-documented 
“tip of the iceberg” limitation produces data with limited breadth, from 
which researchers can only draw limited inferences to the entire popula-
tion of cases filed.81 
By contrast, the study described in this Article addressed these limi-
tations by examining all decisions issued by OSHA and the Office of 
Administrative Law Judges under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  This dataset 
thus represents what social scientists call a “census” or an entire popula-
tion of cases—not merely a sample of cases.  Analyzing a census resolves 
the “tip of the iceberg” problem that inherently limits the inferential 
strength of data obtained only from a commercial database of published 
decisions.82 Thus this Article can draw stronger inferences from the 
broader dataset of a census than inferences drawn from a sample. 
Original Sources vs. Secondary Compilations. Second, this study evalu-
ates “deeper” data than data available through the Database approach.  
The Database method typically produces data from a broad, comprehen-
sive pool of cases, but the data itself is limited and narrow.  For example, 
the Administrative Office of the Federal Courts maintains a database for 
all federal cases.83 Scholars generally regard the Administrative Office 
 
78 See id. at 126. 
79 See id. at 125-26; Parker, supra note 15, at 899-900 (describing methodology in 
which research assistants coded opinions for 61 factors). 
80 See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 77, at 125-126 (noting that “published deci-
sions are a skewed sample” of all judicial decisions); Colker, Windfall, supra note 15, at 
103-04 (recognizing this limitation); Colker, Winning, supra note 15, at 246 (acknowledging 
the “selection bias” inherent in examining appellate cases by searching Westlaw); Juliano 
& Schwab, supra note 15, at 557 (acknowledging that studying only published judicial 
opinions “may not be a random sample of all judicial decisions”). 
81 See Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue, Studying the Iceberg from Its Tip: A Com-
parison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 L. & SOC’Y REV.
1133, 1144 (1990) (warning researchers that published judicial opinions represent less than 
fifteen percent of employment discrimination complaints filed); see also Clermont & 
Eisenberg, supra note 77, at 125 (noting that when studying only published opinions, “it is 
tough to infer truths about the underlying mass of disputes or what lies below disputes”). 
82 Given that this study examines only cases actually filed under Sarbanes-Oxley, 
this study gives insight into a much greater part of the “iceberg” of disputes than the 
Westlaw approach.  However, the study does not provide insight into the entire iceberg, 
i.e., it does not consider disputes in which a case is settled, ignored or otherwise disposed 
of before a formal complaint is filed with OSHA. 
83 See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 17, at 430. 
UNFULFILLED EXPECTATIONS 
14 
data as reliable and valid,84 but recognize that it provides limited data, 
typically only about procedural issues and outcomes.85 By contrast, this 
study evaluated the original source of administrative Sarbanes-Oxley 
decisions:  the written decisions themselves.  Moreover, this study coded 
information contained in these decisions using rigorously-applied social 
scientific methods, thus yielding more nuanced, “deeper” data beyond 
simply procedural or outcome information.  In short, this study produced 
detailed and complex data, such as the types of factual allegations made 
by the whistleblower and the rationales used by the decision-maker— 
data that is not analyzed in studies utilizing the Database method because 
such information is simply not available for analysis in the government-
compiled databases.86 Data gathered from original sources, as employed 
in this study, present a more intricate and thus complete picture of a set 
of claims and their resolutions than data obtained through the Database 
method.87 
Both the Westlaw method and the Database method have strengths 
and weaknesses.  The method used in the research reported in this Arti-
cle, however, retains the advantages of each of the other two methods 
while minimizing their corresponding disadvantages.  In short, to deter-
mine why so few employees succeeded in Sarbanes-Oxley anti-retaliation 
cases, this study gathered original data that were both broad—covering a 
census of cases—and deep—including descriptions of the important 
particulars of the cases. 
 
84 See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 77, at 127-29 (discussing the database’s 
strengths and weaknesses). 
85 See id. at 127 (noting that the forms used to compile the Administrative Office da-
tabase include “data regarding the names of the parties, the subject-matter category and 
the jurisdictional basis of the case, the case’s origin in the district as original or removed or 
transferred, the amount demanded, the dates of filing and termination in the district court 
or the court of appeals, the procedural stage of the case at termination, the procedural 
method of disposition, and, if the court entered judgment or reached decision, the prevail-
ing party and the relief granted”); id. at 128 (noting that the Administrative Office data 
“do not contain many other things one would like to know.  They show no particulars of 
each lawsuit”) (emphasis added); id. at 129 (“More generally, the Administrative Office’s 
data are just a bunch of codes about a limited number of case features.”). 
86 OSHA does collect some data related to its Sarbanes-Oxley decisions; however, 
the data available to the public is generally limited to outcome data for each case, i.e. 
whether the Complainant or Respondent won, or if the case was withdrawn or settled.  
With regard to the ALJs, on April 28, 2005, the Office of Administrative Law Judges 
stopped compiling statistics for Sarbanes-Oxley cases related to the type of disposition at 
the ALJ Level.  See E-mail from Todd Smyth, Office of Administrative Law Judges, to 
Richard Moberly, Asst. Prof. of Law, Univ. of Neb. College of Law (Feb. 15, 2006) (on file 
with author).  Before that date, the OALJ collected only outcome statistics, not the more 
complex data obtained by this study.  See id. 
87 Of course, all studies have limitations.  One limitation of relying on written deci-
sions is that the data are derived from what OSHA investigators and ALJs determine is 
important in a case.  See Juliano & Schwab, supra note 15, at 558-59 (discussing this limita-
tion).  With this limitation in mind, strong inferences can still be drawn in this Article 
because my analysis focuses on the rationales provided by these decision-makers, thus 
minimizing the study’s limitation.  Nonetheless, the limitation is important to consider 
when addressing a party’s factual allegations, because these allegations are described 
through the lens of a decision-maker justifying his or her result.  See id. at 559 (cautioning 
that a researcher using data derived from judicial decisions should be “sophisticated and 
somewhat tentative in the conclusions” drawn from such decisions). 
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The Specifics. This study examined decisions from the first two levels 
of Sarbanes-Oxley’s administrative process: (1) the initial decision by 
OSHA, as set forth in a decision letter sent to the parties from the Secre-
tary of Labor (the “OSHA Level”); and (2) if the parties requested a 
hearing with an Administrative Law Judge, the decision published by the 
ALJ (the “ALJ Level”).  The study included all OSHA Level decisions 
from the first Sarbanes-Oxley complaint on August 19, 2002 through 
complaints filed on July 13, 2005 (n=470), as well as all decisions from the 
ALJ Level, from the effective date of the Act through June 1, 2006 (n=236).  
This census of Sarbanes-Oxley decisions involved 491 Complainants at 
the OSHA Level and 237 Complainants at the ALJ Level.88 
The study was divided into two phases in which cases from each 
level (OSHA and ALJ) were analyzed and coded separately on Excel 
spreadsheets.  The cases were coded for numerous variables: 134 vari-
ables for OSHA decisions and 121 variables for ALJ opinions.89 
In general, each level of cases was coded for the following categories 
of variables: 
• descriptive variables related to the employee, including gender, whether 
the employee was represented by an attorney, and the employee’s job 
title; 
• variables describing the allegations made by the employee related to (1) the 
type of retaliation allegedly suffered by the employee; (2) the type of 
protected activity in which the employee alleged to have engaged; 
(3) the position of the person to whom the employee alleged to have 
provided information regarding illegal activity; and (4) the type of il-
legal activity the employee alleged to have reported; 
• outcome variables identifying whether the case ended in a win for the 
employee, a win for the employer, a withdrawal by the employee, a 
settlement, or was sent to arbitration; and 
• variables related to the types of rationales and evidence utilized by the 
decision-maker when deciding for either the employee or the em-
ployer. 
The variables were intended to be “objective,” such that, as put by 
the authors of a previous study in another area of employment law, 
“well-trained legal professionals should reach the same answers in most 
cases.”90 
I randomly divided the OSHA and ALJ cases among the coders for 
coding.  For OSHA cases, the selection of cases for each coder included 
 
88 The OSHA decisions were obtained from OSHA through a Freedom of Informa-
tion Act (FOIA) request, while the ALJ decisions were obtained from the website of the 
Office of Administrative Law Judges.  Each ALJ opinion in a Sarbanes-Oxley case is 
published at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/LIBWHIST.HTM.   
89 A well-regarded study of published sexual harassment court opinions utilized a 
similar methodology for coding written opinions by decision-makers, although the coding 
variables used in that study and this study obviously differ.  See Juliano & Schwab, supra 
note 15, 555-60.   
90 See id. at 558.  The coders for the OSHA cases were two law students who com-
pleted their first year of study at a law school in the Midwestern U.S.  The coders for the 
ALJ cases included the two OSHA coders, a recent graduate of that same law school, and 
the author.  I gave the student coders specific instruction on the Act’s legal requirements 
and trained them through repeated practice coding sessions. 
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the same randomly-selected 52 cases (approximately 10% from each year) 
to check inter-coder reliability.91 The coders had 95.82% agreement for 
their coding of variables for these overlapping cases.  The high agreement 
rate among coders indicates that the coded results are reliable.92 
For ALJ cases, the coders had 90.41% agreement for their coding of 
variables.  After correcting for coder input errors and misunderstanding 
of the coding for two specific variables,93 the coders had 93.97% agree-
ment.94 The remaining differences were interpretative, and these 
differences were resolved through discussion among the coders.  The 
agreed-upon coding became the data used in the study.  Again, given the 
high agreement rate and the discussion regarding the few differences, the 
coded results for the ALJ cases are also reliable.95 
Before statistical analyses, I matched OSHA decisions with any sub-
sequent ALJ decision related to the OSHA complaint.  I matched cases 
using employer names96 and synchronizing key variables, such as filing 
dates, decision dates, and case numbers.  After this process, 186 cases 
contained both OSHA and ALJ decisions.  Forty-three  cases (involving 
forty-four employees) contained information only from ALJ opinions, 
while 305 cases contained information only from OSHA decisions.97 
Thus, the data contained information for 535 employees who filed for 
relief under Sarbanes-Oxley.  The final data spread sheet contained 223 
variables across the 535 employees, ultimately yielding 119,305 cells, or 
data points.98 
91 The coders did not know which cases were included among these overlapping 52 
cases. 
92 See KIMBERLY A. NEUENDORF, THE CONTENT ANALYSIS GUIDEBOOK 143 (2002) (“It's 
clear from a review of the work on reliability that reliability coefficients of .90 or greater 
would be acceptable to all . . . .”). 
93 These coding issues are addressed more thoroughly in the detailed description of 
the study’s methodology that can be found at the author’s website: 
http://law.unl.edu/inside.asp?d=faculty&id=28. 
94 An inordinate amount of the differences between the coders occurred in the 6 
cases in which the employee prevailed.  Although these cases amounted to 2.54% of cases 
(6/236), coding differences on these cases totaled 23.55% of all the differences.  Coders on 
these 6 cases had an agreement rate of 74.87%.  The most likely explanation for such a 
disparity on these types of cases might be that these opinions are extraordinarily long.  
Except for one case in which a default judgment was entered, the opinions in the other 
five employee-win cases averaged 55 pages in length.  The agreement rate for all cases 
other than the 6 employee-win cases was 95.71%. 
95 See NEUENDORF, supra note 92, at 143. 
96 I was unable to use the employee’s name as a means of matching cases because 
OSHA redacted information related to the identity of the employee when OSHA re-
sponded to the FOIA request. 
97 The forty-three cases with only ALJ decisions were missing OSHA decisions for 
one of two reasons: either I could not reasonably link the ALJ case to an OSHA case based 
upon the method discussed above, or the ALJ case was related to an OSHA case filed after 
July 13, 2005, the date of my FOIA request, and therefore would not be included in the 
documents produced by OSHA.  Of the 305 OSHA decisions with no corresponding ALJ 
opinion, 129 either settled or withdrew at the OSHA Level, and therefore would not have 
any ALJ case associated with it.  The balance of 176 cases either did not request an ALJ 
hearing or the ALJ decision had not been released by June 1, 2006, the end date of the 
study. 
98 Copies of the code books describing the study’s variables and the spreadsheets 
used for statistical analyses are available from the author upon request. 
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Researchers employ hypothesis-testing statistics with associated al-
pha levels to infer that sample characteristics represent the population 
from which the sample was drawn with a specific probability of accu-
racy.99 In this study, no sampling occurred; instead I analyzed a complete 
census of cases for the time period described above.  Thus, I did not 
calculate and do not report statistical findings with alpha levels.  Instead, 
I report exact statistical characteristics for the population of cases under 
study.100
I did not include ARB decisions in the study because only a small 
number of ARB opinions addressed legal or factual issues related to 
Sarbanes-Oxley.  As of September 30, 2006, the ARB issued 39 Sarbanes-
Oxley opinions involving review of 33 cases.101 Of those 39 opinions, only 
13 addressed legal or factual issues related to Sarbanes-Oxley.  The other 
opinions addressed ARB procedural policies, or indicated that the case 
was either withdrawn or settled.  Of course, ARB decisions substantively 
affect the administrative review process, as the ARB’s interpretation of 
the Act is binding on OSHA and the ALJs.  Accordingly, I will discuss the 
impact of an ARB decision on a particular legal issue where appropriate.  
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This Part examines two types of results from the study.  First, in or-
der to contextualize the study’s explanations for why so few employees 
won Sarbanes-Oxley claims, Section A provides a statistical “big picture” 
view of the outcomes for all Sarbanes-Oxley cases.  Second, to explain the 
low employee win rate described in Section A, Section B examines the 
rationales used by OSHA and the ALJs when finding against the em-
ployee.  In this section, I conclude that employees rarely won because 
OSHA and the ALJs determined that a large percentage of employees 
failed to prove a Sarbanes-Oxley claim as a matter of law, often by nar-
rowly construing the Act’s legal parameters.  Moreover, for the cases that 
survived this strict legal analysis, OSHA found that a vast majority of 
employees failed to satisfy Sarbanes-Oxley’s burden of proof.  
A. The Big Picture: Outcomes from the Administrative Process 
The win rates for employees and employers in cases that fully com-
pleted each stage of administrative review were remarkably one-sided.  
As Table 1 indicates, employees won 3.6% of the cases completed at the 
OSHA Level, and 6.5% of the cases completed at the ALJ Level.   
 
99 See BERNARD E. WHITNEY, JR., PRINCIPLES OF RESEARCH IN BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 429 
(2d ed. 2001). 
100 Cf. NEUENDORF, supra note 92, at 168 (arguing that content analysis to answer re-
search questions regarding common occurrences or themes “would probably best be 
addressed with simple frequencies of occurrence and no test of statistical significance”). 
101 ARB cases can be found at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/ 
ARB/REFERENCES/CASELISTS/ARBINDEX.HTM, where they are listed by date. 
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Table 1 – Win Rates For Cases that Completed Each Level of Administrative Review 
 OSHA Level ALJ Level 
Employee  
Win Rate 
 
3.6% 
(13)a
6.5% 
(6) 
Employer  
Win Rate 
 
96.4% 
(348) 
 
93.5% 
(87) 
NOTE:  Table 1 reports the percentage of cases won by each party when OSHA or an ALJ made a 
determination for either the Complainant-employee or the Respondent-employer. 
aAll numbers in parentheses reflect the number of cases in each category. 
 
Moreover, the win rate for employees at the OSHA Level appears to 
be decreasing over time.  The win rates set forth in Table 1 do not include 
any OSHA cases filed after July 13, 2005, the end date of the OSHA part 
of the study.   Yet, according to preliminary statistics released by OSHA 
for decisions through September 30, 2006, employees won 3.1% of the 
cases decided at the OSHA Level since Sarbanes-Oxley’s enactment.102
No employee won in any of the 159 cases OSHA resolved in Fiscal Year 
2006, after the end of the study.103 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s low employee win rate, while surprising, appears 
even more disproportionate when compared to win rates for employees 
asserting claims under statutes other than Sarbanes-Oxley.  Table 2, 
below, summarizes win rates for employees and plaintiffs raising claims 
in a variety of administrative and judicial fora.   
As with the Sarbanes-Oxley win rates discussed thus far, the win 
rates set forth in Table 2 are for cases that completed the administrative or 
judicial process with a decision rendered for one of the parties; therefore, 
cases that settled or were voluntarily withdrawn are not included.104 
102 See E-mail from Nilgun Tolek, Director, OSHA Office of Investigative Assistance, 
to Richard Moberly, Asst. Prof. of Law, Univ. of Neb. College of Law (Oct. 3, 2006) (on file 
with author).   
103 See id. 
104 I do not report the results of a test for statistical significance comparing the de-
scriptive statistics displayed in Table 2.  Such a test would be inappropriate because the 
descriptive statistics displayed in Table 2 are based on data gathered from diverse popula-
tions using different sampling techniques at divergent points in time.  However, if win 
rates were approximately equal across employment cases and venues from Fiscal Years 
2003 to 2005, we would expect to see win rates that differed in only minor ways, regard-
less of the sampling techniques.  Thus, while the win rates in Table 2 may not be 
statistically comparable, they provide interesting points of conceptual comparison and a 
contextual perspective for the Sarbanes-Oxley win rate discussed in this Article.   
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Table 2 - Comparison of Win Rates For Various Types of Claims Resolved by 
Administrative Agencies and Federal Courts 
 Employee/Plaintiff Win Rate 
Employer Win 
Rate 
Energy 
Reorganization 
Act 
2.9% 
(4)a
97.1% 
(136) 
Sarbanes-Oxley 
(OSHA Level) 
3.6% 
(13) 
96.4% 
(348) 
OSHA 
Whistle-
blower 
Casesb
AIR21 9.8% 
(19) 
90.2% 
(175) 
Age 
Discrimination 
 
5.2% 
(1,655) 
 
94.8% 
(30,405) 
Race-Based Charges 6.0% 
(3,772) 
94.0% 
(59,280) 
Pregnancy  
Discrimination 
7.2% 
(615) 
92.8% 
(7,922) 
Disability Charges 9.1% 
(2,972) 
90.9% 
(29,837) 
Religious  
Discrimination 
10.6% 
(578) 
89.4% 
(4,858) 
Sex-Based Charges 10.6% 
(5,343) 
89.4% 
(44,840) 
Equal Pay Act 
Charges 
13.7% 
(271) 
86.3% 
(1,707) 
EEOC 
Casesc
Sexual 
Harassment Cases 
14.1% 
(3,255) 
85.9% 
(19,775) 
Employment  
Cases 13.0% 87.0% 
All Non-Jobs Cases 52.9% 47.1% 
Federal 
Court 
Casesd Torts and Contracts 
Cases 62.4% 37.6% 
aAll numbers in parentheses reflect the number of cases in each category. 
bThe Sarbanes-Oxley results are derived from the study’s results.105 OSHA provided the other 
statistics to the author for Fiscal Years 2003-2005.106 
c The EEOC statistics were compiled from statistics published on the EEOC’s website for Fiscal Years 
2003-2005.107 
d The federal court statistics are from data collected by the federal government for cases filed in 
federal court from 1979-2000.108 
105 See supra Table 1. 
106 See E-mail from Nilgun Tolek, Director, OSHA Office of Investigative Assistance, 
to Richard Moberly, Asst. Prof. of Law, Univ. of Neb. College of Law (Oct. 5, 2006) (on file 
with author). 
107 See http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/enforcement.html.  The statistics include deci-
sions in which the EEOC made a “reasonable cause” determination and cases in which the 
EEOC issued a “no reasonable cause” determination, which together appear to include all 
of the cases that resulted in a final administrative decision by the EEOC.  In other words, 
these numbers do not include cases that were settled or withdrawn, or cases in which the 
complainant requested a “right-to-sue” letter after 180 days and thus never received an 
actual finding from the EEOC (labeled “administrative closures” on the website).  See id. 
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With the exception of whistleblowers under the Energy Reorganiza-
tion Act, Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblowers succeeded at a lower rate than a 
broad range of employees and other plaintiffs, regardless of whether an 
employee brought a different statutory claim under OSHA’s jurisdiction, 
in a process administered by an agency other than OSHA, or as a plaintiff 
in federal court.  For example, even though Congress based Sarbanes-
Oxley’s protections upon the provisions of AIR21, airline industry whis-
tleblowers succeeded at more than twice the rate of Sarbanes-Oxley 
whistleblowers (9.8%). 
This low employee win rate should give pause.  Almost without ex-
ception, both critics and supporters of employee-rights acknowledge the 
employee-friendly nature of Sarbanes-Oxley, with burdens of proof 
clearly intended to enhance a whistleblower’s chance of winning.109
Despite these provisions, however, the Act fails to produce correspond-
ing employee victories. 
It should be noted that the Sarbanes-Oxley win rates set forth in Ta-
ble 1 do not include all of the possible outcomes of a Sarbanes-Oxley 
complaint filed with OSHA: Table 1 addresses only cases in which an 
administrative decision was made.  Sarbanes-Oxley complaints also could 
settle, be withdrawn,110 or be sent to arbitration.  Table 3 sets forth the 
percentage of cases resolved with each of these possible outcomes at both 
the OSHA and the ALJ levels of review. 
 
108 Professors Clermont & Schwab reported this data.  See Clermont & Schwab, supra 
note 17, at 429-31, 457 (2004).  “Employment” cases included actions filed under Title VII, 
the ADA, the ADEA, the FMLA, and employment-related claims filed under 42 U.S.C. § 
1981 or § 1983.  See id. at 431.  Plaintiff win rates for “torts and contracts” cases were 
compiled from “13 sizable torts and contracts categories.”  See id. at 458.  The “nonjobs” 
cases are all federal cases other than the “employment” cases.  See id. 
109 See supra text accompanying notes 50-52; see also Philip M. Berkowitz, Whistle-
blower Regulations, 27 NAT’L L.J., Sept. 20, 2004, at 1 (noting “the extraordinary risk [to 
business] that this statute imposes”); Cathleen Flahardy, SOX Gives DOL Power to Reinstate 
Whistleblowers: Employers Struggle to Defend Themselves Against Wrongful Termination 
Claims, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 2005, at 24 (quoting management attorneys who recog-
nize that the “burden of proof for an employee to establish a violation is very low”); 
Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Whistle-Blower Retaliation Liability Cascading, NAT’L UNDERWRITER 
23, 24 (Aug. 14, 2006).
110 See id. § 1980.114(a).  Of all ALJ cases in which the employee withdrew (n=92), 
almost half (45, or 48.9%) declared that they were filing in federal court, while another 5 
(5.4%) stated that they intended to file a claim in state court.  The data did not provide a 
rationale for the withdrawal for a fairly large number of these ALJ cases: 30, or 32.6%.  At 
the OSHA Level, a large percentage of cases, 72.2%, did not provide a reason for the 
employee’s withdrawal.  A complete table setting forth the rationales provided by em-
ployees who withdrew complaints can be found on the author’s website:  
http://law.unl.edu/inside.asp?d=faculty&id=28. [NOTE TO LAW REVIEW EDITORS: I 
AM WILLING TO INCLUDE THIS AND OTHER TABLES IN AN APPENDIX IF YOU 
THINK IT IS APPROPRIATE.] 
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Table 3 - Outcomes of OSHA and ALJ Review 
Outcome OSHA Level ALJ Level 
Employer Win 
 
70.9% 
(348)a
37.8% 
(87) 
Employee Win 
 
2.6% 
(13) 
 
2.6% 
(6) 
Employee Withdrawal  
 
14.7% 
(72) 
 
40.0% 
(92) 
Settlement 
 
11.6% 
(57) 
 
18.3% 
(42) 
Arbitration111 0.2% 
(1) 
 
0.2% 
(3) 
Total  
 
100.0% 
(491) 
 
100.0% 
(230) 
aAll numbers in parentheses reflect the number of cases in each category. 
 
As Table 3 demonstrates, almost three-fourths of cases at the OSHA 
Level (73.5%) received a determination either for the employee or the 
employer.  ALJs, however, resolved dramatically fewer of the cases filed 
(40.4%) because more employees settled or withdrew their claims.  While 
the study focused on the cases that fully completed each stage of the 
administrative process, the settlements and withdrawals certainly im-
pacted the types of cases left to be resolved by administrative decision-
makers. 
The extent of this impact is difficult to determine.  Settlement of a 
case may provide some indication that the case had at least minimal merit 
and therefore arguably could be counted as an employee success.  Indeed, 
settlements may have removed the strongest employee cases from the 
pool of cases, causing the employee win rate in resolved cases to appear 
lower than the number of “meritorious” claims actually filed.112 On the 
other hand, given the higher settlement rate at the ALJ Level than at the 
 
111 These cases either were ordered to arbitration or the parties agreed that arbitra-
tion was the more appropriate forum, both because of arbitration agreements in 
employment contracts.  As demonstrated by Table 3, arbitration issues had little impact 
because a case was sent to arbitration only four times, once at the OSHA Level of review 
and three times by an ALJ.  This seemingly low number could be the result of an early 
federal court decision that required a Sarbanes-Oxley plaintiff to arbitrate a Sarbanes-
Oxley claim, which could have influenced employees with arbitration agreements to not 
even attempt to file their claims administratively.  See Boss v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 
263 F. Supp.2d 684, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
112 In fact, OSHA computes its percentage of “merit” resolutions by combining set-
tlements with employee wins.  See E-mail from Nilgun Tolek, Director, OSHA Office of 
Investigative Assistance, to Richard Moberly, Asst. Prof. of Law, Univ. of Neb. College of 
Law (Oct. 3, 2006) (on file with author). 
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OSHA Level, a settlement may simply reflect an employer’s increased 
willingness to enter “nuisance-value” settlements rather than pay the 
high litigation costs of an ALJ hearing.113 Or employers may have settled 
a case involving allegations of corporate fraud to avoid bad publicity, 
even if the allegations were without merit.114 
The settlement rate for Sarbanes-Oxley cases appears similar to the 
settlement rate for claims before the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC), the other primary administrative forum for em-
ployment claims.  EEOC claims settled at approximately the same rate—
14.7% from Fiscal Years 2003 to 2005—as Sarbanes-Oxley OSHA cases.115 
Both these settlement rates pale in comparison to the settlement rate for 
cases once they reach the court system.  For example, scholars estimate 
that more than 60% of cases filed in federal court settled.116 As indicated 
by Table 3, Sarbanes-Oxley cases settled at a much lower rate: 11.6% at 
the OSHA Level and 18.36% at the ALJ Level.  This lower rate may indi-
cate that parties were less willing to settle in the early years of Sarbanes-
Oxley, perhaps because the parties lacked certainty regarding the possi-
ble breadth of OSHA’s and the ALJs’ interpretations of the scope of the 
Act.  On the other hand, given the similar settlement rate for EEOC 
claims, Sarbanes-Oxley’s settlement rate may reflect less willingness to 
settle in an administrative forum rather than in a court case.   
The ambiguity of the settlement data in the study conceals the full 
meaning of a Sarbanes-Oxley settlement as it relates to the employee win 
rate.117 Do settlements provide employees relief comparable to wins?  It 
is difficult to say whether a settlement should be counted as an employee 
“win,” given that both sides inevitably compromise their claims when 
 
113 The study’s results support this inference because 16.9% of employer wins at the 
OSHA level settle after they win, which is higher than the settlement rate before the OSHA 
decision in the employer’s favor.  Another explanation for this settlement rate, however, is 
that employees may be more willing to settle after losing at the OSHA Level. 
114 There is some anecdotal evidence of this phenomenon in the Sarbanes-Oxley 
context.  See Judy Greenwald, Whistleblower Retaliation Claims Challenging Employers, 39 
BUS. INS. 4 (Sept. 26, 2005) (“Some observers say fear of being associated with a Sarbanes-
Oxley whistleblower suit is leading some employers to settle even when they feel the 
claim has no merit.  ‘They fear the potential bad publicity,’ said James S. Urban, an 
attorney with Jones Day in Pittsburgh.”); see also Michael R. Triplett, Uncertainty About 
Parameters of SOX Claims Creates Challenges for Lawyers on Both Sides, 4 WORKPLACE LAW 
REPORT 482, 482 (April 14, 2006), available at http://pubs.bna.com/ip/bna/whl.nsf/eh/ 
a0b2q6p0v8 (reporting that a management attorney claims employers have a clear incen-
tive to settle Sarbanes-Oxley cases before entering the administrative review process 
because of the types of complaints Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblowers lodge and the high-
level position often held by whistleblowers). 
115 I calculated this settlement rate from statistics published on the EEOC website by 
combining the number of settlements and withdrawals with benefits (n=36,781) by the 
total number of resolutions during Fiscal Years 2003 to 2005 (n=250,366).  See 
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/all.html. 
116 See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 77, at 136 (noting that 66.7% of all federal 
civil cases terminated during fiscal year 2000 settled); Parker, supra note 15, at 912 (finding 
a settlement rate of 67% in study of race and national origin discrimination cases in two 
federal district courts in 2002). 
117 Cf. Colker, Winning, supra note 15, at 256 (“It is hard to categorize settlements as 
pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant since plaintiffs typically settle for less than they seek in 
litigation.”); Parker, supra note 15, at 910 (“[A] settlement can’t be defined as either a win 
or a loss.”). 
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they settle.118 Unfortunately, OSHA refuses to release data that could 
provide insight into this issue: the amount paid in settlement costs.119 
Similarly, employee withdrawals have uncertain meaning in this 
context.  One assumption may be that employees with strong cases with-
drew from the administrative process to file in federal court, with the 
hope of obtaining a large damage award from a jury.  Yet, the study’s 
results demonstrate that 41% of the cases that employers won at the 
OSHA Level were withdrawn by employees before an ALJ decision could 
be reached.120 Moreover, a substantial number of cases that withdrew 
likely had little or no merit: either employees withdrew without asserting 
any reason for their withdrawal (72.2% at the OSHA Level and 32.6% at 
the ALJ Level), or because the employee admitted that a prima facie case of 
retaliation could not be proven (2.8% and 6.5%), or because of some other 
reason, such as admitting that they had misunderstood the purpose of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act or determined that further litigation expenses were 
not warranted (5.6% and 6.5%).  Thus, a reasonable conclusion may be 
that employees with weaker cases withdrew.  These withdrawals could 
have depleted the pool of strong employer cases, resulting in a higher 
employee win rate than if these claims had been resolved administra-
tively.  
Ultimately, the data presently available regarding Sarbanes-Oxley 
settlements and withdrawals do not provide definitive answers regarding 
the objective merit of either the overall pool of cases or the cases that 
receive administrative decisions.121 Thus, we do not know, and cannot 
determine, whether employees filed “good” or “bad” Sarbanes-Oxley 
cases.122 
118 See Parker, supra note 15, at 909. 
119 Through the Freedom of Information Act, I requested settlement information 
from OSHA and the Office of Administrative Law Judges, both of which are required to 
approve Sarbanes-Oxley settlement agreements.  See 29 C.F.R. § 1980.111(d) (2006).  OSHA 
denied this request and my request to the OALJ is still pending.  OSHA denied my 
request because many parties who enter settlement agreements request that OSHA 
consider the settlement amount as “confidential business information” under Exemption 4 
to the Freedom of Information Act.  See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4).  Although I have disputed the 
appropriateness of this designation and appealed OSHA’s decision, my appeal has not 
been resolved. 
120 A complete table setting forth the outcome at the ALJ Level of cases in which the 
employer won at the OSHA Level can be found on the author’s website:  
http://law.unl.edu/inside.asp?d=faculty&id=28.   
121 If settlements and withdrawals are included in calculations regarding employee 
success rate, the numbers change dramatically.  Employee wins and settlements combined 
are 14.2% of all OSHA cases filed, and 20.9% of all ALJ filings.  See supra Table 3.  If 
withdrawals and arbitrations are excluded because they did not complete the process, the 
employee wins and settlements combined are 16.7% of the remaining OSHA cases filed, 
and 34.8% of the remaining ALJ cases.  See id. 
122 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal 
Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
581, 588-89 (1998) (explaining that inferences from win rates to generalizations about the 
types of cases being filed can be dangerous).  Similarly, little can be inferred from the 
results of this study regarding the overall affect of Sarbanes-Oxley in the workplace, such 
as whether more or less whistleblowing or more or less retaliation occurs, as these con-
cerns lie beyond the scope of the present study.  This study does not examine the overall 
pool of potential Sarbanes-Oxley cases, only the actual pool of such cases filed with OSHA.  
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However, the employee win rate presented in Table 1 is meaningful 
if combined with an analysis of the types of decisions made by OSHA 
and the ALJs when resolving Sarbanes-Oxley claims.  The manner in 
which OSHA and the ALJs reached their decisions provide some explana-
tion for this unexpectedly-low employee win rate.  Thus, the balance of 
this Part empirically examines how OSHA and the ALJs resolved so many 
cases in favor of employers and against employees.   
B. Explaining the Low Win Rate: The Importance of Procedural, Boundary, 
and Factual Hurdles 
A Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower must overcome a series of hurdles 
in order to prevail in either an OSHA investigation or an ALJ hearing.  
Failing to surmount any of these hurdles will result in an employer vic-
tory. 
First, procedural hurdles require that the employee take action in a 
timely manner: the retaliation must have occurred after the effective date 
of the Act,123 the complaint must be filed within 90 days of the retalia-
tion,124 and any appeal must be filed within 30 days of an OSHA 
decision.125 When OSHA or an ALJ makes a decision in favor of an em-
ployer because the employee failed to overcome one of these hurdles, the 
study identified that decision as using a “procedural rationale.”   
Second, an employee must demonstrate that the claim is within the 
boundaries of Sarbanes-Oxley: the whistleblower must be a covered em-
ployee,126 work for a covered employer,127 engage in a covered (i.e., 
“protected”) activity,128 and suffer a covered adverse employment ac-
 
See id. (“[T]he case-selection effect theory holds that win rates reveal something about the 
set of adjudged cases, and not much about the underlying mass of disputes and cases.”). 
123 See McIntyre v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 2003-SOX 23 (Dep’t 
of Labor Jan. 16, 2004); Kunkler v. Global Futures & Forex, Ltd., 2003-SOX-6 (Dep’t of 
Labor Apr. 24, 2003); Gilmore v. Parametric Tech. Corp., 2003-SOX-1 (Dep’t of Labor Feb. 
6, 2003).  Even if the protected activity occurred before the effective date of Sarbanes-Oxley, 
a whistleblower claim could be based on retaliation that occurred after the effective date.  
See, e.g., Getman v. Southwest Secs., Inc., 2003-SOX-8 (Dep’t of Labor Feb. 2, 2004). 
124 See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D) (Supp. 2004). 
125 See 29 C.F.R. § 1980.105(c) (2006). 
126 ALJs consistently have not permitted workers in a foreign country to assert 
claims under Sarbanes-Oxley.  See, e.g., Concone v. Capital One Financial Corp., 2005-
SOX-6 (Dep’t of Labor Dec. 3, 2004); Ede v. Swatch Group, 2004-SOX-68 (Dep’t of Labor 
Jan. 14, 2005). 
127 See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (Supp. 2004) (prohibiting retaliation by any “company 
with a class of securities registered under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(15 U.S.C. § 781), or that is required to file reports under Section 15(d) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78o(d))”). 
128 Not only must the employee complain about an illegal activity covered by Sar-
banes-Oxley, but also the employee must reasonably believe that the activity is covered by 
Sarbanes-Oxley and the employer must know about the employee’s complaint.  See id. 
Although there is some dispute, one scholar has argued convincingly that the “reasonable 
belief” issue presents a legal question to be resolved by a judge.  See Jarod S. Gonzalez, 
SOX, Statutory Interpretation, and the Seventh Amendment: Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Whistleblower 
Claims and Jury Trials, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 25, 76 (2006). 
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tion.129 If an employer won because an employee’s claim fell outside of 
these boundaries, then OSHA or the ALJ used a “boundary rationale.” 
Third, a decision-maker will evaluate the factual merits of the case, 
but only after the employee satisfied all the procedural rules and demon-
strated that the complaint is within the boundaries of Sarbanes-Oxley.  At 
that point, an employee must overcome factual hurdles by convincing the 
decision-maker that the whistleblower’s protected activity was a contrib-
uting factor in the adverse employment action (i.e., causation) and by 
withstanding the employer’s attempt to demonstrate by “clear and con-
vincing” evidence that it would have made the same employment 
decision absent any protected activity.130 As with the other two hurdles, 
if an employer won because an employee failed to show causation or 
because the employer satisfied its clear and convincing burden of proof, 
then the case can be thought of as being decided by a “factual rationale.” 
The low win rate for employees (and corresponding high win rate for 
employers) can be explained, at least in part, by examining the effect of 
these hurdles on an employee’s case. 
1. The Size of the Hurdle Depended on the Level of Review 
The three categories of rationales set forth above contain eleven dif-
ferent grounds on which a decision against an employee may rest; one or 
more was cited in almost every case an employer won.131 Table 4 pre-
sents the percentage of employer wins in which OSHA or an ALJ utilized 
each of these rationales.   
 
129 Sarbanes-Oxley states it is unlawful for a covered employer to “discharge, de-
mote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an employee 
in the terms and conditions of employment” because the employee engaged in protected 
activity.  18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (Supp. 2004). 
130 See discussion supra Part II.A (discussing Sarbanes-Oxley’s burdens of proof); cf. 
Gonzalez, supra note 128, at 75 (arguing that, in cases removed to federal court, a “SOX 
jury’s main role as the fact finder is to resolve the issue of causation”). 
131 A twelfth, “other” category can also be found in the cases.  Of the 324 employer-
win OSHA cases in which a rationale was discernable, 15 included a rationale other than 
one of the 11 set out in Table 4.  Nine of these 15 simply stated that employee’s prima facie 
case was not satisfied, but did not specify which elements were not met.  Of the 83 such 
cases at the ALJ Level, 5 included this “other” rationale. 
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Table 4 – Rationales Used When an Employer Wins 
Type of 
Rationale 
Rationale Used OSHA 
Level 
ALJ 
Level 
Sarbanes-Oxley Not 
Retroactive 
 
2.8% 
(9)a
3.6% 
(3) 
Statute of Limitations 
 
18.8% 
(61) 
 
33.8% 
(28) 
Procedural 
Appeal Time Exceeded n/a 
 
4.8% 
(4) 
Not a Covered Employee 
 
7.1% 
(23) 
 
4.8% 
(4) 
Not a Covered Employer 
 
15.4% 
(50) 
 
28.9% 
(24) 
No Protected Activity 
 
18.2% 
(59) 
 
24.1% 
(20) 
No Adverse Action 
 
11.1% 
(36) 
 
9.6% 
(8) 
No Reasonable Belief 
 
5.6% 
(18) 
 
14.5% 
(12) 
Boundary 
No Employer Knowledge 
 
5.9% 
(19) 
 
2.4% 
(2) 
No Causation 
 
35.5% 
(115) 
 
21.7% 
(18) Factual 
Employer Satisfies “Clear and 
Convincing” Standard on 
Rebuttal 
 
11.7% 
(38) 
 
14.5% 
(12) 
NOTE:  The percentages do not total 100% because OSHA and the ALJs often provided one or more 
rationale when deciding a case.  The percentages used in Table 4 are based on the number of cases in 
which coders could identify a specific rationale divided by the number of cases in which coders 
could identify any rationale.  Of the 348 cases in favor of the employer at the OSHA Level, a ration-
ale (other than the “other” category) was discernable in 324.  Accordingly, 324 is used as the 
denominator for Table 4’s percentages.  Of the 87 employer-win cases at the ALJ Level, 83 had 
discernable rationales (other than the “other” category) and therefore this number is used as the 
denominator. 
aAll numbers in parentheses reflect the number of cases in each category. 
 
A pattern develops when these rationales are ordered by categories.  
The data displayed in Table 5 demonstrate that OSHA and the ALJs 
decided cases in favor of employers by utilizing somewhat different 
rationales. 
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Table 5 – Rationale Used in Cases Decided in Favor of Employer 
 OSHA Level ALJ Level Difference 
Procedural 
Rationale 
 
21.0% of cases 
(68)a
39.8% 
(33) 
1.89 times 
more likely at 
ALJ Level 
Boundary  
Rationale 
 
54.3% 
(176) 
 
67.5% 
(56) 
1.24 times 
more likely at 
ALJ Level 
Factual 
Rationale 
 
44.8% 
(145) 
 
24.1% 
(20) 
1.86 times 
more likely at 
OSHA Level 
NOTE:  In Table 5, the percentages do not total 100% because OSHA and the ALJs often provided 
more than one type of rationale when deciding a case.  As with Table 4, the percentages used in 
Table 5 are based on the number of cases in which coders identified a specific rationale divided by 
the number of cases in which coders identified any rationale: 324 OSHA cases and 83 ALJ cases.   
aAll numbers in parentheses reflect the number of cases in each category. 
 
At both levels of review, OSHA and the ALJs resolved a substantial 
number of cases in favor of the employer as a matter of law, by using either 
a procedural or a boundary rationale.  Although ALJs used both ration-
ales more frequently than OSHA, decision-makers at both levels of 
review relied heavily on a legal analysis of a Sarbanes-Oxley claim prior 
to resolving any factual disputes. 
At the OSHA Level, however, factual rationales played an important 
role as well.  OSHA used one of the two factual rationales as part of the 
case’s determination in almost half of the cases – 44.8%.  Indeed, OSHA 
used a factual rationale—that the employee failed to demonstrate causa-
tion—more frequently than any other single rationale.  Over 35% of the 
cases decided in favor of the employer utilized this specific rationale, 
either alone or in combination with other rationales.132 
By contrast, ALJs tended to resolve cases with one of the procedural 
or boundary rationales by determining that Sarbanes-Oxley did not cover 
the employee’s allegations.  In all cases decided in favor of the employer, 
ALJs relied solely on factual issues only 4.8% (4 out of 83) of the time.  In 
other cases in which an ALJ utilized a factual rationale, it was in conjunc-
tion with one of the other two types of rationales.133 Thus, even when 
ALJs addressed the substantive facts of a case, they typically did so only 
when also deciding the case as a matter of law with a procedural or 
boundary rationale.  ALJs, explicitly or implicitly, utilized the lawyerly 
“even if…” argument to address factual issues only as a backstop to other 
arguments.134 By comparison, OSHA relied solely on factual issues 29.0% 
 
132 See supra Table 4. 
133 Of the 20 cases in which ALJs used a factual rationale, only 4 were decided solely 
based on that type of rationale (20%).  In the other 16 cases, a factual rationale was used in 
conjunction with one or both of the other two types of rationales (80%).  By contrast, of the 
145 cases decided by OSHA using a factual rationale, OSHA cited only the factual ration-
ale in 94 (64.8%) of these decisions.  OSHA utilized the factual rationale in conjunction 
with the one or both of the other rationales in 51 cases (35.2%). 
134 See id. 
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of the time135—meaning that OSHA was approximately six times more 
likely than an ALJ to cite factual issues as determinative.   
This difference in emphasis impacted the outcomes of cases as they 
progressed through the administrative process.  The data in Table 6 
reveal that ALJs typically upheld OSHA decisions when those decisions 
were based upon procedural or boundary grounds.  However, for the 
cases that OSHA decided based on factual rationales, ALJs scrutinized 
those cases again for legal deficiencies, particularly boundary issues.  
Given that the ALJ review is de novo, one expects a review of the same 
issues examined at the OSHA Level.  Nonetheless, ALJs appear more 
likely to decide cases on procedural or boundary grounds, even if OSHA 
already utilized a factual rationale.   
Table 6 - Rationales Used for Employer-Wins at Each Level 
 ALJ Procedural 
ALJ 
Boundary 
ALJ 
Factual Total 
OSHA 
Procedural 
 
64.0% 
(16)a
28.0% 
(7) 
 
8.0% 
(2) 
 
100.0% 
(25) 
OSHA 
Boundary 
 
20.0% 
(9) 
 
62.2% 
(28) 
17.8% 
(8) 
 
100.0% 
(45) 
OSHA 
Factual 
 
10.0% 
(3) 
 
46.7% 
(14) 
 
43.3% 
(13) 
100.0% 
(30) 
NOTE:  The numbers in Table 6 do not equal the total number of employer-win cases at the ALJ 
Level because more than one rationale could be coded for each case.  The numbers in bold represent 
consistent decision-making across both levels. 
aAll numbers in parentheses reflect the number of cases in each category. 
 
This pattern of decision-making effectively prevented employees 
from obtaining an ALJ hearing on their complaints’ factual merits. ALJs 
held factual hearings in only 28.0% of the cases in which an ALJ rendered 
a decision.136 Moreover, having a hearing before an ALJ did not guaran-
tee that the ALJ evaluated the factual merits of a case.  In over half 
(58.6%) of the 29 cases in which an ALJ held a factual hearing, the ALJ 
decided the case on boundary grounds.137 
In sum, Sarbanes-Oxley cases endured two rigorous filtering systems 
as they advanced through the administrative process.  First, both OSHA 
and the ALJs rejected cases based on procedural and boundary rationales.  
Second, even if a case survived OSHA’s rigorous legal evaluation, OSHA 
also rejected a large percentage of cases because the employee failed to 
satisfy Sarbanes-Oxley’s burden of proof or because the employer satis-
fied its clear and convincing burden.  Interestingly, ALJs typically upheld 
 
135 Of the 324 cases that were decided for the employer at the OSHA Level and from 
which a rationale could be discerned, OSHA utilized only a factual rationale in 94 cases. 
136 ALJs held hearings in 26 out of the 93 cases in which ALJs rendered a decision. 
137 When ALJs held a hearing, ALJs resolved the case using a procedural rationale 
6.9% of the time (n=2); a boundary rationale 58.6% of the time (n=17); and a factual 
rationale 58.6% of the time (n=17).  These totals do not equal 100.0% because ALJs often 
used more than one rationale. 
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these OSHA determinations for the employer, but in so doing ALJs util-
ized legal rather than factual rationales.  ALJs relied only rarely on a 
factual determination alone to resolve a Sarbanes-Oxley claim.  
2. Specific Legal Hurdles Loomed Large 
OSHA and the ALJs focused on three “legal” rationales when decid-
ing in favor of the employer: one procedural rationale and two related to 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s boundaries.  As detailed below, the administrative 
focus on these three issues often led to narrow interpretations of Sar-
banes-Oxley’s legal parameters that negatively impacted employees’ 
claims.  
a. Statute of Limitations 
Both OSHA and the ALJs focused intently on whether the employee 
filed a Sarbanes-Oxley claim within the Act’s 90-day statute of limita-
tions.  In approximately one-third (33.8%) of the ALJ cases decided in 
favor of the employer, ALJs found that the employee failed to file a claim 
within the 90-day statute of limitations.138 OSHA utilized this rationale in 
18.8% of cases it decided in favor of the employer.139 Despite this seem-
ing difference between OSHA and the ALJs, both levels of review often 
found violations of the statute of limitations in the same cases, indicating 
a similar focus by both sets of decision-makers.  OSHA used this rationale 
in 72.2% of the ALJ cases that also found a statute of limitations viola-
tion.140 
In many cases, administrative decision-makers have little or no dis-
cretion regarding enforcement of the statute of limitations: the Act is clear 
regarding the 90-day limitations period.  Moreover, the Department of 
Labor’s regulations clarify that the 90-day filing window begins when an 
employee has knowledge of an adverse employment action, not when the 
action actually occurred.141 Accordingly, these clear rules required that 
OSHA and ALJs reject complaints because employees failed to file within 
90 days of the notice of an adverse action, even if the adverse action 
actually occurred within 90 days of the filing of the complaint.142 
138 See supra Table 4.  
139 See id. 
140 The study obtained data on the OSHA result in 18 of the 28 ALJ statute of limita-
tions cases, and OSHA also concluded that the statute of limitations was not met in 13 of 
those 18 cases (72.2%), indicating that OSHA also seems to focus on the statute of limita-
tions issue.  (The other ten cases were cases in which an ALJ opinion was available, but no 
OSHA opinion was included in the production of cases from OSHA in response to my 
FOIA request.)  Thus, it may be that statute of limitations cases are appealed to ALJs at a 
higher rate, which would account for the higher use of the statute of limitations rationale 
at the ALJ Level.    
141 See Procedures, supra note 48, at 52106. 
142 See, e.g., Lawrence v. AT&T Labs, 2004-SOX-65, at 5 (Dep’t of Labor Sept. 9, 
2004); Halpern v. XL Capital, Ltd., 2004-SOX-54 (Dep’t of Labor June 7, 2004); Letter from 
Marthe B. Kent, Regional Administrator, OSHA (Oct. 2, 2003) (on file with author); Letter 
from Adam M. Finkel, Regional Administrator, OSHA, to Michelle R. Kestler (Feb. 3, 
2003) (on file with author). 
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However, OSHA and the ALJs also strictly enforced the statute of 
limitations in cases in which discretion could be utilized to excuse an 
employee’s late filing.  For example, OSHA and ALJs consistently re-
buffed employees’ claims that the statute of limitations should be tolled 
or not enforced for equitable reasons.  Equitable tolling of the statute of 
limitations typically is permitted when an employee is unable, despite 
due diligence, to gain information necessary to file a timely complaint.143
Similarly, equitable estoppel prevents enforcement of the statute of limi-
tations because the employer stopped the employee from filing a timely 
complaint.144 Neither equitable argument has had much success in Sar-
banes-Oxley cases.145 For example, in one ALJ case the parties agreed that 
while they explored settlement options, the employee would not file a 
Sarbanes-Oxley claim and the employer would not assert a statute of 
limitations defense.146 As a result, the employee ultimately filed a com-
plaint outside of the limitations period.147 The ALJ rejected the 
application of equitable tolling or estoppel principles, and dismissed the 
case for failure to file within the limitations period, despite the agreement 
of the parties to the contrary.148 
Administrative decision-makers equitably tolled the statute of limita-
tions in only one case.  In a case brought against Southwest Securities 
very early in the life of the Act, both OSHA and an ALJ permitted a pro se 
employee to pursue a claim even though she missed the deadline by two 
days.149 The employee had attempted to file her complaint with various 
governmental agencies other than OSHA prior to the expiration of the 
statute of limitations, but did not file with OSHA until after the limita-
tions period had run.150 Under these unique circumstances, both OSHA 
and the ALJ determined that her efforts to file her claim in the wrong 
forum equitably tolled the limitations period.151 This case stands out for 
another reason besides the application of the equitable tolling doctrine: 
the employee ultimately won her claim, making her one of only thirteen 
employees at the OSHA Level and one of only six employees at the ALJ 
 
143 See Santa Maria v. Pacific Bell, 202 F.3d 1170, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000).  
144 See id. at 1176.   
145 See, e.g., Levi v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., Inc., 2006-SOX-37, at 22-23 (Dep’t of Labor 
May 3, 2006); Guy v. SBC Global Servs., 2005-SOX-113, at 3-4 (Dep’t of Labor Dec. 14, 
2005); Letter from Marthe B. Kent, Regional Administrator, OSHA (Apr. 7, 2005) (on file 
with author); Letter from Marthe B. Kent, Regional Administrator, OSHA (Dec. 7, 2004) 
(on file with author). 
146 See Szymonik v. Tymetrix, Inc., 2006-SOX-50, at 2 (Dep’t of Labor Mar. 8, 2006). 
147 See id. 
148 See id. at 5.  Although ARB decisions are not included in this study, it should be 
noted that the ARB follows a similarly rigid line.  Prior to October 1, 2006, employees 
requested equitable tolling either of the statute of limitations or of an appeals filing 
deadline in six Sarbanes-Oxley cases before the ARB.  The Board refused such requests in 
every case.  The Board also denied an employer’s request for equitable tolling of the 
deadline for filing a cross-appeal in the one case involving such a request from the em-
ployer.  See Henrich v. EcoLab, Inc., No. 05-036, at 1 (ARB Mar. 31, 2005). 
149 See Getman v. Southwest Sec., Inc., 2003-SOX-8, at n.2 (Feb. 2, 2004); Letter from 
Patricia K. Clark, Regional Administrator, OSHA, at 2 (Feb. 12, 2003) (on file with author).  
150 See Getman, 2003-SOX-8, at n.2. 
151 See id. 
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Level to emerge victorious.152 It is intriguing to consider how many other 
claims might have been valid but for the mistake of filing after the limita-
tions deadline. 
b. Covered Employers 
ALJs, and to a lesser extent OSHA, also focused on whether the Re-
spondent was a “covered employer” under Sarbanes-Oxley.  ALJs 
decided 28.9% of their cases in favor of Respondent because the Act failed 
to cover the employer.153 By comparison, OSHA decided 15.4% of its 
cases with this rationale.154 When an ALJ found that the Respondent was 
not a “covered employer,” the corresponding opinion from OSHA used 
this rationale less than half of the time (42.1%).155 ALJs, then, found that 
the employer was not the type of company covered by Sarbanes-Oxley at 
a much higher rate than OSHA and often in cases in which OSHA did not 
focus on that issue. 
The difference between OSHA and the ALJs when evaluating the 
“covered employer” issue seems to result from ambiguity in the Act’s 
statutory language.  The Act provides that: 
No company with a class of securities registered under sec-
tion 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 
781), or that is required to file reports under section 15(d) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78o(d)), or 
any officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such 
company, may [retaliate] against an employee for engaging in 
lawful protected conduct.156 
The Act clearly covers employees of publicly-traded companies, i.e., 
companies that have a class of securities registered under § 12 or that are 
required to file reports under § 15.157 Determining whether a company is 
publicly-traded or privately-held is relatively straight-forward: either a 
respondent meets one of these two definitions or it does not.158 Accord-
ingly, it seems logical that OSHA and the ALJs would make this finding 
at relatively equivalent rates, which they did.  OSHA found a company 
 
152 See id. at 26.  The ARB later overturned her victory for an unrelated reason.  See 
Getman v. Southwest Securities, No. 04-059 (ARB July 29, 2005).   
153 See supra Table 4. 
154 See id. 
155 Twenty-four ALJ cases used this rationale.  See supra Table 4.  The study included 
OSHA data for 19 of those 24 cases.  In those 19 cases, OSHA also utilized the “not a 
covered employer” rationale in 8 cases (42.1%).   
156 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (Supp. 2004) (emphasis added). 
157 See id. 
158 Id. Perhaps not surprisingly, disputes on the borderline of this issue have arisen.  
See Flake v. New World Pasta Co., No. 03-126, at 2 (ARB Feb. 25, 2004) (finding that 
respondent was not covered under the Act because its registration statement was auto-
matically suspended when its shares were held by less than 300 people); Stalcup v. 
Sonoma College, 2005-SOX-114 (Dep’t of Labor Feb. 7, 2006) (finding that respondent 
which filed registration statement that had not yet become effective was not covered by 
the Act); Roulett v. Am. Capital Access, 2004-SOX-9, at 7-8 (Dep’t of Labor Dec. 22, 2004) 
(finding that company which withdrew request for registration was not covered). 
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was “privately held” in 64.0% of the cases in which OSHA cited the 
“covered employer” rationale, while ALJs made this finding in 58.3% of 
the relevant cases.159 
However, the statutory language does not clearly set forth whether 
the Act applies to privately-held subsidiaries of publicly-traded compa-
nies.  The ALJs focused on this ambiguity much more intensely than 
OSHA.  In 41.7% of ALJ cases using the “not a covered employer” ration-
ale, ALJs found that an employer was not covered by the Act because it 
was a subsidiary of a publicly-traded company or a foreign company.  By 
contrast, OSHA made this same determination at about one-fourth the 
rate, 10.9%.  Thus, the difference in usage of the “covered employer” 
rationale between OSHA and the ALJs seems best explained by the dif-
ference in how these administrative decision-makers evaluated private 
subsidiaries of public companies. 
The subsidiary issue arises in Sarbanes-Oxley cases because the Act 
prohibits discrimination by “any officer, employee, contractor, subcon-
tractor, or agent” of publicly-traded companies.160 Early conflicting ALJ 
interpretations of this phrase as it relates to whether Sarbanes-Oxley 
covers privately-held subsidiaries of publicly-traded corporations may 
have caused differing levels of enforcement by ALJs and OSHA.  Soon 
after the Act’s enactment, an ALJ interpreted this phrase broadly to mean 
that employees of privately-held subsidiaries were protected by the Act, 
particularly if the employee named the publicly-traded parent as a re-
spondent.161 Other ALJs permitted employees of privately-held 
subsidiaries to bring Sarbanes-Oxley claims because the employee spe-
cifically alleged that the publicly-held parent company was involved in 
the retaliation162 or that the subsidiary was a “mere instrumentality” of 
the private corporation.163 All of these findings occurred before Septem-
ber 2004. 
These early and relatively broad interpretations of the Act’s “covered 
employer” provision may have influenced OSHA’s reluctance to rely on 
this rationale in finding for the employer.  However, beginning in late-
2004 and early-2005, ALJ opinions consistently demonstrated a stricter 
reading of this provision.  Some ALJs held that employees of privately-
held subsidiaries could not bring a Sarbanes-Oxley claim at all.164 Others 
rejected claims because the employee did not specifically name the pub-
licly-traded parent as a respondent, and ALJs refused to allow the 
employee to amend the complaint.165 Many ALJs required that an em-
 
159 A complete table setting forth the types of companies OSHA and the ALJs found 
were not “covered employers” can be found on the author’s website:  
http://law.unl.edu/inside.asp?d=faculty&id=28. 
160 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (Supp. 2004).  
161 See Morefield v. Exelon Servs., Inc., 2004-SOX-2, at 2-3 (Dep’t of Labor Jan. 28, 
2004). 
162 Gonzalez v. Colonial Bank, No. 2004-SOX-39, at 3 (Dep’t of Labor Aug. 20, 2004). 
163 Platone v. Atlantic Coast Airlines, No. 2003-SOX-27, at 19 (Dep’t of Labor Apr. 
30, 2004). 
164 See Grant v. Dominion East Ohio Gas, 2004-SOX-63, at 33 (Dep’t of Labor Mar. 
10, 2005).   
165 See Bothwell v. Am. Income Life, No. 2005-SOX-57, at 7 (Dep’t of Labor Sept. 19, 
2005); see also Powers v. Pinnacle Airlines, Inc. 2003-SOX-12 (Dep’t of Labor March 5, 
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ployee either pierce the corporate veil between the subsidiary and the 
parent166 or demonstrate that the publicly-trade parent company partici-
pated in the adverse employment action.167 
The ALJs’ attention to the “covered employer” issue and subsequent 
narrowing of the scope of this statutory provision seems to have affected 
OSHA.  Although the cumulative results from the study indicate a differ-
ence between OSHA and the ALJs in the use of the “not a covered 
employer” rationale compared to other rationales,168 any distinction 
between ALJs and OSHA regarding enforcement of this covered em-
ployer requirement occurred primarily in the first few years after the 
statute’s enactment.  
Chart 1 - OSHA Decisions Finding that Respondent Was Not a Covered Employer 
 
OSHA may have responded to the more recent and numerous ALJ 
decisions narrowing the scope of this boundary issue.  As indicated in 
Chart 1, in the first two years of Sarbanes-Oxley decisions, OSHA found 
that the Respondent was not a “covered employer” in a total of 23 
cases.169 In the first three quarters of 2005 alone, however, OSHA made 
 
2003).  In the Klopfenstein decision mentioned in the previous footnote, the ARB found that 
publicly-traded parent companies did not need to be named as a respondent in order for 
an employee of a privately-held subsidiary to bring a Sarbanes-Oxley claim.  See Klopfen-
stein, No. 04-149, at 2. 
166 See Bothwell, 2005-SOX-57, at 6-9; Dawkins v. Shell Chemical, LP, 2005-SOX-41, at 
4 (Dep’t of Labor May 16, 2005); Hughart v. Raymond James & Assoc., Inc., 2004-SOX-9, at 
44 (Dep’t of Labor Dec. 17, 2004); cf. Powers v. Pinnacle Airlines, Inc., 2003-SOX-12 (Dep’t 
of Labor March 5, 2003) (earlier case). 
167 See Bothwell, 2005-SOX-57, at 9; see also Hughart, 2004-SOX-9, at 44 (liability ex-
tended to parent only in area where “parent has exerted its influence or control”).  In May 
2006, the ARB adopted similarly-restrictive interpretations of the Act by permitting a 
claim against a privately-held subsidiary, but only because the employee specifically 
demonstrated that the subsidiary acted as an agent of the publicly-traded parent company 
when the subsidiary fired the employee.  See Klopfenstein v. PCC Flow Technologies 
Holdings, Inc. & Allen Parrott, No. 04-149, at 15 (ARB May 31, 2006).  The ARB found 
significant the fact that the subsidiary and the parent had overlapping officers and that 
the person who made the decision to fire the whistleblower served as an officer of both 
the subsidiary employer and the parent company. See id. 
168 See supra text accompanying notes 153-55; see also supra Table 4. 
169 A complete table setting forth the use of the “not a covered employer” over time 
can be found on the author’s website:  http://law.unl.edu/inside.asp?d=faculty&id=28.   
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this finding 25 times.  This upward trend in OSHA’s use of the “not a 
covered employer” rationale may reflect the attention OSHA pays to ALJ 
opinions regarding the definitional boundaries of the Act.  As of the end 
of the time period covered by the study, it seems fair to conclude that both 
OSHA and the ALJs focused intensively on whether the named employer 
was “covered” by Sarbanes-Oxley’s statutory definition.  Moreover, ALJs 
and the ARB have significantly narrowed the applicability of Sarbanes-
Oxley’s protections by strictly defining which companies are “covered” 
by the Act. 
c. Protected Activity 
OSHA and the ALJs focused on a third legal question: whether the 
employee engaged in “protected activity” covered by Sarbanes-Oxley.  
The Act protects only whistleblowers who disclose violations of one or 
more of six specific types of laws, rules, or regulations.  Specifically, in 
order to be protected, an employee must disclose any conduct that the 
employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation of: 
 
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud); 
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud); 
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (banking fraud); 
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (securities fraud);  
5. Any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion; or 
6. Any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against sharehold-
ers.170 
In 24.1% of the cases ALJs found in favor of the employer, ALJs de-
termined that the employee did not engage in protected activity because 
the whistleblower’s disclosure did not relate to one of these statutorily-
defined illegal activities.171 OSHA relied on this rationale in 18.2% of the 
cases in which the employer prevailed.172 
Employees alleged certain protected activities far more frequently 
than others.  As Table 7 indicates, employees alleged that they blew the 
whistle on general “fraud” or fraud related generally to “accounting” at a 
much higher rate than more specific types of fraud mentioned by the Act, 
including mail and wire fraud, banking fraud, and securities fraud.173 
Moreover, an extremely high number of employees did not assert that 
they disclosed illegal activity related to any of the categories set forth by 
Sarbanes-Oxley: 48% of OSHA Complainants and 52.7% of ALJ Com-
 
170 See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (Supp. 2004). 
171 See supra Table 4. 
172 See id. 
173 These more specific types of fraud were only coded in the study if the decision 
mentioned these very specific words or statutory provisions as part of the allegations.  In 
contrast, coders employed general “fraud” as a catch-all category in which fraud was 
mentioned in the decision, but not related to a specific statutory provision.  Similarly, 
“accounting fraud” was coded if an allegation related to accounting, but not to a more 
specific category. 
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plainants alleged protected activity in the “other” category, at least as 
these allegations were described by administrative decision-makers in 
their written opinions.174 
These data are particularly relevant when examined next to data of 
cases in which the decision-maker found for the employer precisely 
because the employee did not engage in a protected activity.  In these “no 
protected activity“ cases, certain types of illegal activity were alleged 
more frequently than in the overall pool of cases.  Table 7 compares the 
data regarding “protected activity” allegations from the overall pool of 
cases with cases in which the decision-maker found for the employer 
specifically because “no protected activity” occurred.  As indicated in 
Table 7, when OSHA or an ALJ utilized the “no protected activity” ra-
tionale, the employee alleged blowing the whistle on illegal activity 
falling within the “other” category and the “fraud” category more fre-
quently than in the overall pool of cases.   
Employees alleged protected activity in the “other” category in 78.9% 
and 75% of the cases at the OSHA and ALJ Levels, respectively, in which 
decision-makers utilized the “no protected activity” rationale.  In the 
overall pool of cases, 48.1% of the OSHA Complainants and 52.7% of the 
ALJ Complainants alleged the “other” category.  A similar, yet smaller, 
jump can be seen when comparing the general “fraud” category in the 
same way.  A higher percentage of cases utilized this rationale among the 
“no protected activity” cases than among the overall population of cases: 
31.6% versus 24.2% at the OSHA Level and 45.0% versus 28.0% at the ALJ 
Level.  Thus, when OSHA and ALJs decided for an employer because the 
employee did not allege the proper “protected activity,” these decision-
makers often utilized this rationale in cases in which the employee al-
leged generalized protected activity, such as disclosing “fraud” or some 
“other” misconduct.  Employees who alleged specific types of miscon-
duct, such as “mail fraud” or “federal law relating to shareholder fraud,” 
rarely lost cases because the decision-maker found “no protected activ-
ity.”   
The increase in the two general categories for the “no protected activ-
ity” rationale could reflect OSHA’s and ALJs’ reluctance to broadly define 
the categories of whistleblower disclosures that will be protected by 
Sarbanes-Oxley.  These two categories of “fraud” and “other” misconduct 
could be characterized as the most amorphous and least bound by the 
specific statutory language of the Act.  In other words, those employees 
who framed their whistleblower disclosures to fall neatly within the Act’s 
specific statutory provisions, such as mail or wire fraud, bank fraud, or 
securities fraud, fared better than employees who alleged protected 
activity less grounded in statutory language. 
 
174 These decisions may not necessarily reflect the language used by an employee to 
describe the employee’s protected activity.  The results do reflect how OSHA and the ALJs 
thought about the employee’s allegations regarding protected activity. 
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Table 7 - Type of Protected Activity Alleged When the “No Protected Activity” 
Rationale is Used Compared to the Overall Pool of Cases 
Protected 
Activity 
(Type of Illegal 
Activity Dis-
closed by 
Whistleblower)
All 
OSHA 
Cases 
“NPA” 
Rationale 
Used – 
OSHA 
All ALJ 
Cases 
“NPA” 
Rationale 
Used –  
ALJ 
Banking Fraud 
(§ 1344) 
1.4% 
(6)a
3.5% 
(2) 
2.7% 
(5) 
0.0% 
(0) 
Securities 
Fraud 
(§ 1348) 
3.6% 
(15) 
1.8% 
(1) 
4.8% 
(9) 
0.0% 
(0) 
Mail / Wire 
Fraud 
(§§ 1341 / 1343)
4.8% 
(20) 
3.5% 
(2) 
7% 
(13) 
0.0% 
(0) 
Violation of 
SEC Rules and 
Regs 
8.6% 
(36) 
3.5% 
(2) 
11.3% 
(21) 
15% 
(3) 
Federal Law 
Relating to 
Shareholder 
Fraud 
15.3% 
(64) 
8.8% 
(5) 
19.9% 
(37) 
15% 
(3) 
Fraud 24.2% 
(101) 
31.6% 
(18) 
28.0% 
(52) 
45% 
(9) 
Accounting 
Fraud 
29.4% 
(123) 
14.0% 
(8) 
31.7% 
(59) 
40.0% 
(8) 
Other 48.1% 
(201) 
78.9% 
(45) 
52.7% 
(98) 
75% 
(15) 
NOTE:  The percentages in Table 7 reflect the percentage of cases in which coders could identify the 
type of illegal activity allegedly disclosed.  At the OSHA Level, the type of disclosure made could be 
discerned in 418 cases.  At the ALJ Level, it could be ascertained in 186 cases.  For the “no protected 
activity” columns, the percentages are from the 57 OSHA cases and the 20 ALJ cases in which “no 
protected activity” was the rationale used by OSHA and the ALJ, respectively, and the type of illegal 
activity allegedly disclosed could be discerned.  The percentages do not equal 100% because more 
than one protected activity could be alleged. 
aAll numbers in parentheses reflect the number of cases in each category. 
 
Examining specific ALJ cases qualitatively demonstrates that many 
ALJs interpreted the Act’s “protected activity” requirement narrowly.  
ALJs required that employees draw a direct line between their whistle-
blower disclosures of misconduct and the misconduct’s relationship to 
shareholder fraud.175 For example, in Grant v. Dominion East Ohio Gas, an
175 See, e.g., Grant v. Dominion East Ohio Gas, 2004-SOX-63, at 40 (Dep’t of Labor 
Mar. 10, 2005); Harvey v. Safeway, Inc., 2004-SOX-21, at 32 (Dep’t of Labor Feb. 11, 2005) 
(finding that disclosures about underpayment of wages “did not have the necessary 
magnitude to raise a concern about fraud against the shareholders”); Hopkins v. ATK 
Tactical Sys., 2004-SOX-19, at 5 (Dep’t of Labor May 27, 2004) (dismissing claim based on 
retaliation for disclosing an employer’s “release of sludge water into the ground water 
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ALJ found that an employee properly reported accounting irregularities 
and errors, but found that the employee did not engage in “protected 
activity” because the employee was unable to directly tie these irregulari-
ties to active fraud on the shareholders.176 Similarly, the employees in 
Allen v. Stewart Enterprises, Inc., reported to their supervisors several 
instances of faulty interest calculations, inconsistent and untimely re-
funds, and improper accounting involving cost recognition.177 The ALJ 
refused to find a “protected activity” because the employees could not 
demonstrate that these errors and omissions in financial accounting and 
reporting were related to a broader scheme of intentional corporate 
fraud.178 
ALJs also demanded that employee whistleblowers specifically in-
form the recipient of a whistleblower disclosure that the illegal activity 
being reported violates one of Sarbanes-Oxley’s identified federal laws.179 
Rather than merely reporting activity that an employee reasonably views 
as illegal under this interpretation, the employee must have enough legal 
knowledge to tie that activity to a specific illegality identified by the 
Act.180 
Yet, despite this narrow interpretation by some ALJs, others took a 
relatively broad view of the Act’s “protected activity” requirement in 
specific cases.  One early ALJ decision held that whistleblower disclo-
sures about fraud that amounted to only .0001% of the parent company’s 
revenues could be protected.181 As noted by the ALJ, Sarbanes-Oxley  
places no minimum dollar value on the protected activity it 
covers.  Whether or not “materiality” is a required element of 
a criminal fraud conviction as Respondents contend, we need 
to be mindful that Sarbanes-Oxley is largely a prophylactic, 
not a punitive measure.  The mere existence of alleged ma-
nipulation, if contrary to a regulatory standard, might not be 
criminal in nature, but it very well might reveal flaws in the 
 
system” because disclosure neither alleged fraud nor “involve[d] transactions relating to 
securities”). 
176 See Grant, 2004-SOX-63, at 40-44 (emphasizing that the “limited scope and appli-
cation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act does not cover the complaints and allegations lodged by 
Complainant”). 
177 See Allen v. Stewart Enterprises, 2004-SOX-60, at 83-84 (Dep’t of Labor Feb. 15, 
2005). 
178 See id. at 85-90. 
179 See Grant, 2004-SOX-63, at 39 (“[S]imply raising questions or lodging complaints 
without any reference to or suspicion about fraud against shareholders is not protected 
activity.”).  This requirement seems to contradict other ALJ decisions which held that a 
whistleblower was not required to specifically identify a particular code section that had 
been violated.  See Hendrix v. Am. Airlines, 2004-SOX-23, at 23-24 (Dep’t of Labor Dec. 9, 
2004); Gonzalez v. The Colonial Bank, 2004-SOX-39, at 5 (Dep’t of Labor Aug. 20, 2004) 
(finding “support for the finding” that whistleblower had a reasonable belief that activity 
disclosed involved “misconduct, regardless of whether he could specify specific banking, 
securities, shareholder, or mail fraud violations.”). 
180 See Grant, 2004-SOX-63, at 39; cf. Allen, et al., 2004-SOX-60, at 86 (denying protec-
tion for whistleblower who reported a potential violation of state law, because such an 
illegality is not specifically listed by Sarbanes-Oxley). 
181 See Morefield v. Exelon Servs., Inc., 2004-SOX-2, at 5 (Dep’t of Labor Jan. 28, 
2004). 
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internal controls that could implicate whistleblower coverage 
for seemingly paltry sums.182 
Furthermore, an ALJ held that the Act protected disclosures related 
to improper reimbursements to company employees, with no discussion 
of whether these reimbursements were “material” and thus required 
disclosure under the securities laws.183 Another ALJ found that “pro-
tected activity” included a whistleblower’s report of an employee’s 
improper use of company materials and time to create sculptures for 
retiring co-workers.184 This report was protected because the sculptor 
“undoubtedly uses the mail or wires as part of his sculpture business,” 
and such fraudulent use would violate the mail and wire fraud statutes.185 
Commentators point to these examples and counter-examples as in-
dications that ALJs are working through the Act’s ambiguities, with 
decisions in favor of both employees and employers.186 However, the 
study’s results indicate that the various interpretations of the “protected 
activity” requirement are not as evenly balanced as these examples and 
counter-examples might indicate.  In fact, the study indicates that OSHA 
and the ALJs frequently denied whistleblower claims because the em-
ployee purportedly failed to engage in “protected activity.”187 Fully 
24.1% of ALJ cases and 18.2% of OSHA cases in which the employer won 
were resolved because the employee did not demonstrate the correct 
“protected activity.”188 The study also found that in addition to these 
cases, the ALJ determined that the employee could not reasonably believe 
that the activity disclosed violated a law set forth in Sarbanes-Oxley in 
14.5% of the decisions in which employers won.189 
3. A Surprisingly Unfavorable Burden of Proof 
As discussed above, ALJs relied exclusively or primarily on legal ra-
tionales in 95.2% of the cases won by employers, meaning that ALJs 
resolved only 4.8% of the cases by using solely a factual rationale.190 By 
contrast, OSHA reached the factual issues in 29.0% of the cases decided 
for employers.191 The results of the study call into question whether 
OSHA appropriately applied Sarbanes-Oxley’s employee-friendly burden 
of proof in these cases.   
 
182 Id. 
183 See Platone v. Atl. Coast Airlines, 2003-SOX-27, at 22 (Dep’t of Labor Apr. 30, 
2004). 
184 See Hendrix v. Am. Airlines, 2004-SOX-23, at 22-23 (ALJ Dec. 9, 2004). 
185 See id. 
186 See, e.g., Eugene Scalia, The Developing Law under the Sarbanes-Oxley “Whistle-
blower” Protection Provision, Practising Law Institute, Litigation and Administrative 
Practice Course Handbook Series, PLI Order No. 8327 (Jan. 2006), available on Westlaw at 
735 PLI/Lit 291; Triplett, supra note 114, at 482. 
187 See discussion supra Part IV.B.2. 
188 See supra Table 4. 
189 See id. The “reasonable belief” rationale was used less frequently at the OSHA 
Level.  OSHA used this rationale in 5.6% of the cases that employers won.  See id. 
190 See supra text accompanying note 133.  
191 See id. 
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Sarbanes-Oxley’s burden-of-proof is employee-friendly for two rea-
sons.  First, the Act adopted the “contributing-factor” test for causation.192 
To be a contributing factor, the protected activity must simply be one 
factor, “alone or in connection with other factors,” which “tends to affect 
in any way the outcome of the decision.”193 Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblow-
ers can satisfy this burden of proof more easily than employees under 
many other whistleblower provisions.  The “contributing factor” causa-
tion test demands less evidence than the “causal” language required for 
Title VII retaliation cases194 and perhaps even less than the “motivating 
factor” language utilized in Title VII “mixed-motive” cases.195 As stated 
by the ARB in a Sarbanes-Oxley case, this “test is specifically intended to 
overrule existing case law, which requires a whistleblower to prove that 
his protected conduct was a ‘significant,’ ‘motivating,’ ‘substantial,’ or 
‘predominant’ factor in a personnel action in order to overturn that ac-
tion.”196 In implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley regulations, the 
Department of Labor also recognized the “contributing factor” test as less 
onerous for the employee to satisfy than other causation tests.197 
Second, after establishing causation and the other prerequisites of 
the prima facie case, the employee should win unless the employer demon-
strates that it would have made the same decision absent any protected 
activity.  Significantly, the employer’s burden must be satisfied under the 
“clear and convincing” standard,198 which requires a higher level of proof 
than the typical “preponderance of the evidence” standard utilized by 
other anti-retaliation statutes.199 The U.S. Supreme Court described the 
 
192 See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(C) (Supp. 2004) (adopting the burden of proof stan-
dard from AIR21, 49 U.S.C. § 42121); 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(i) (2000); 29 C.F.R. § 
1980.104 (2006). 
193 See Klopfenstein v. PCC Flow Tech Holdings, No. 04-149, at 18 (ARB May 31, 
2006) (quoting Marano v. Dep't of Justice, 2 F.3d 1137, 1140 (Fed. Cir. 1993)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
194 See, e.g., Septimus v. Univ. of Houston, 399 F.3d 601, 608 (5th Cir. 2005) (“The 
proper standard of proof on the causation element of a Title VII retaliation claim is that 
the adverse employment action taken against the plaintiff would not have occurred ‘but 
for’ her protected conduct.”). 
195 In its explanation of this provision, OSHA noted that 
[t]he “contributing factor” language used in this section is identical to that 
used in the employee protection provisions of the ERA and AIR21, under 
which there is sufficient case law interpreting the phrase. For example, in 
Kester v. Carolina Power & Light Co., No. 02-007, 2003 WL 22312696, * 8 
(Adm. Rev. Bd. Sept. 30, 2003), the ARB noted: “[P]rior to the 1992 amend-
ments, the ERA complainant was required to prove that protected activity 
was a ‘motivating factor’ in the employer's decision. Congress adopted the 
less onerous ‘contributing factor’ standard ‘in order to facilitate relief for 
employees who have been retaliated against for exercising their [whistle-
blower rights].’ 138 Cong. Rec. No. 142 (Oct. 5, 1992).”   
Procedures, supra note 48, at 52107. 
196 See Marano, 2 F.3d at 1140, cited in  Klopfenstein, No. 04-149, at 18. 
197 See Procedures, supra note 48, at 52107. 
198 See Halloum v. Intel Corp., 2003-SOX-7, at 16 (Dep’t of Labor Mar. 4, 2004); 
Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., 2003-SOX-15, at 44 (Dep’t of Labor Aug. 1, 2003); see 
also Vaughn, supra note 8, at 77. 
199 See Halloum, 2003-SOX-7, at 16; Welch, 2003-SOX-15, at 44; see also Vaughn, supra 
note 8, at 77. 
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level of proof needed to satisfy this standard as “highly probable”200—a 
rigorous standard for employers to satisfy.201 
Thus, in a Sarbanes-Oxley case, after an employee presents a prima 
facie case (using the forgiving “contributing factor” standard) the burden 
of proof shifts to the employer, which must then satisfy a significantly 
higher burden than normal.202 
Despite Sarbanes-Oxley’s favorable burden of proof, employees at 
the OSHA Level rarely won when factual issues were evaluated.  One 
hundred seven cases at the OSHA Level presented solely a factual ques-
tion regarding why the employee suffered an adverse action.203 In these 
cases, the employee engaged in protected activity and suffered an ad-
verse employment action.  According to OSHA, the employee overcame 
all the procedural and boundary hurdles.204 The only question to be 
answered was whether the employer retaliated against the employee for 
engaging in a protected activity.  As shown in Table 8, employees pre-
vailed in only 12.1% of these 107 OSHA cases. 
Table 8 - Win Rates For Cases with Only Factual Disputes 
Outcome OSHA Level ALJ Level 
Employee win 
 
12.1% 
(13)a
55.6% 
(5) 
Employer win 
 
87.9% 
(94) 
 
44.4% 
(4) 
Total 
 
100.0% 
(107) 
 
100.0% 
(9) 
NOTE:  Employer wins were included when “causation” or the employer’s “rebuttal” were the only 
rationales provided by the decision-maker. 
aAll numbers in parentheses reflect the number of cases in each category. 
 
By contrast, at the ALJ Level, only a small number of cases—10.2%, 
or 9 out of 88—presented a factual issue regarding causation or the em-
ployer’s rebuttal burden.205 As discussed above, procedural or boundary 
 
200 Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984); see also KOHN, supra note 8, at 
62. 
201 See Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp. v. Herman, 115 F.3d 1568, 1572 (11th Cir. 1997) 
(recognizing under the same statutory framework found in the Energy Reorganization 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5851, that “[f]or employers, this is a tough standard”). 
202 See Klopfenstein, No. 04-149, at 19-21. 
203 This number was derived by examining cases in which OSHA decided in favor 
of the employer based solely on a factual rationale (n=94) and cases in which the em-
ployee prevailed (n=13).  The employee wins were included because these cases, by 
definition, reached the factual merits of the complaint. 
204 In other words, OSHA did not utilize a procedural or boundary rationale in its 
determination. 
205 See id. The total of nine ALJ cases was calculated by combining five employee 
wins on the merits with 4 employer wins in which an ALJ utilized a factual rationale.  
Although 6 employees won at the ALJ Level, one employee won by default because the 
employer did not appear at the hearing.  Thus, the ALJ did not address the factual issues 
in the case. 
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rationales resolved the remaining ALJ employer-win cases.206 Of these 
nine cases involving only factual disputes, ALJs decided over half (5, or 
55.6%) in favor of the employee.207 
Comparing the 12.1% win rate at the OSHA Level for “factual” cases 
with other win rates emphases its aberrational nature.208 The strongest 
comparison may be with similar cases at the ALJ Level, in which 55.6% of 
employees win when only factual issues are evaluated.  However, given 
the small raw number of ALJ decisions, consider other comparisons.  For 
example, under other employment statutes, win rates for cases that sur-
vive summary judgment and have a trial are analogous to win rates for 
cases with only factual disputes set forth in Table 8.  A study of whistle-
blower wrongful discharge cases in California in 1998 and 1999 found 
that employees won 63% of the time at trial209—over five times the rate of 
employee wins at the OSHA Level under Sarbanes-Oxley.  Another study 
found that, in 2001, 39.5% of employment discrimination plaintiffs won 
trials in federal court.210 When compared with these win rates, the 12.1% 
win rate for factual cases at the OSHA Level seems extraordinarily low. 
One explanation for this 12.1% win rate may be that OSHA inappro-
priately utilized Sarbanes-Oxley’s employee-friendly burden of proof.  
For example, the employee’s initial burden to prove that the employee’s 
protected activity was a “contributing factor” in the retaliation should be 
a relatively low burden for an employee to overcome.  Yet, as shown in 
Table 9, in approximately two-thirds of the 107 “factual rationale” cases 
(65.4%), OSHA determined that the employee did not meet this relatively 
low burden.  Thus, because OSHA determined that the employee failed to 
present a prima facie case of retaliation in these cases, OSHA never shifted 
the burden from the employee to force “clear and convincing” proof from 
the employer.211 By contrast, at the ALJ Level, the opposite result oc-
curred.  ALJs found that employees satisfied the “contributing factor” 
causation test and shifted the burden to employer in 66.7% of the “factual 
rationale” cases at the ALJ Level.212 
206 See supra text accompanying note 133. 
207 See Table 8.  The ALJ results also confirm the impact ALJs’ focus on legal ration-
ales has on an employee’s chance of success.  If employees survived ALJs’ legal analysis of 
procedural and boundary issues, employees seemed to benefit from Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
favorable burden of proof. 
208 Although the win rates in Table 8 seem to approach, and even surpass, the win 
rates under other statutes set forth in Table 2, supra, the employee win rates set forth in 
Table 8 occur in cases with only factual disputes, i.e., all of the legal hurdles have been 
overcome.  The win rates in Table 2 are overall win rates for cases in which a decision was 
rendered at any stage in the administrative or judicial process. 
209 See Oppenheimer, supra note 15, at 538. 
210 See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 17, at 441. 
211 Six of these 70 cases won by the employer alternatively held that the employer 
satisfied its “clear and convincing” evidence burden, utilizing an “even if” argument. 
212 See Table 9. 
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Table 9 - Determination of Causation Issue 
Outcome OSHA Level ALJ Level 
For Employee – Employee 
demonstrated causation 
 
34.6% 
(37)a
66.7% 
(6) 
For Employer – Employee failed 
to demonstrate causation 
 
65.4% 
(70) 
 
33.3% 
(3) 
Total 
 
100.0% 
(107) 
 
100.0% 
(9) 
NOTE:  Table 9 shows the result when “causation” is resolved under the “contributing factor” test.  
Cases resolved “for the employer” utilized the causation rationale.  Cases resolved for the employee 
on this issue included cases in which the employee won and cases in which the employer won solely 
because the employer satisfied its rebuttal burden of proof. 
aAll numbers in parentheses reflect the number of cases in each category. 
 
Furthermore, even when OSHA shifted the burden to the employer 
and the issue was whether the employer met the “clear and convincing” 
standard, OSHA found in favor of the employer in a surprising number 
of cases.  As set forth in Table 10, employees won only thirteen of the 
thirty-seven cases (35.1%) in which the employer had a “clear and con-
vincing” burden of proof.  Importantly, these employee wins occurred in 
Sarbanes-Oxley cases in which all Sarbanes-Oxley’s legal requirements 
were met and the employer—not the employee—had the burden of proof 
under a “clear and convincing” standard.  This difference in burdens 
should and can matter: by comparison, when the dispositive issue at the 
ALJ Level was whether the “clear and convincing” burden was met, 
employees won 83.3% of the time.213 
The results at the OSHA Level contradict expectations, for these were 
cases in which the employee supposedly met all of the “legal” hurdles 
required by Sarbanes-Oxley.  The employee engaged in protected activity 
and suffered an adverse employment action.  The only question was 
whether a causal link existed between these events.  Given the low bur-
den for employees to prove this point and the high burden for employers, 
in essence, to disprove a negative (that it would have made the same 
decision regardless of the protected activity) on rebuttal, it seems reason-
able to expect that more than 12.1% of employees would win these 
“factual” cases.   
 
213 See id. It should be noted that the number of cases is very small: only six cases 
reached this stage, five of which were won by employees.  This disparity between OSHA 
and the ALJs seems to support the conclusion that OSHA may examine the factual issues 
more readily than the ALJs, but when ALJs do examine them, the results seem more 
favorable to employees than at the OSHA Level. 
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Table 10 - Determination of Employer’s Rebuttal Burden of Proof 
Outcome OSHA Level ALJ Level 
For Employee – Employer failed 
to satisfy burden of proof by 
clear and convincing  
evidence 
 
35.1% 
(13) 
83.3% 
(5) 
For Employer – Employer 
satisfied burden of proof 
 
64.9% 
(24) 
 
16.7% 
(1) 
Total 
 
100.0% 
(37) 
 
100.0% 
(6) 
aAll numbers in parentheses reflect the number of cases in each category. 
 
A possible explanation for these findings is that OSHA did not have 
the resources to investigate Sarbanes-Oxley cases in the time frame the 
agency’s regulations required for it to complete an investigation.214 Al-
though Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower cases currently consist of 
approximately 13% of the whistleblower cases administered by OSHA,215 
OSHA did not receive any additional funding to increase its investigative 
staff by hiring investigators with experience in securities laws as opposed 
to worker health and safety.216 This lack of resources may have caused 
investigators to take shortcuts, thereby limiting the depth and scope of 
inquiry into an employee’s claims.  Indeed, some employees and their 
attorneys assert that OSHA investigators did not interview employee-
complainants and failed to provide employees with a chance to fully 
argue their case.217 
In addition to OSHA’s lack of resources, OSHA’s investigative man-
ual does not adequately explain Sarbanes-Oxley’s unique burden of proof 
structure.  The sections of the manual that explain general investigative 
procedures give examples from the less employee-friendly burden of 
proof found in the Occupational Safety and Health Act.218 This general 
 
214 As noted above, see supra text accompanying note 68, the average time between 
the filing of a Sarbanes-Oxley complaint with OSHA and the issuance of a report by the 
OSHA investigator was 127 days for Fiscal Year 2005.  See E-mail from Nilgun Tolek, 
Director, OSHA Office of Investigative Assistance, to Richard Moberly, Asst. Prof. of Law, 
Univ. of Neb. College of Law (Feb. 15, 2006) (on file with author).  OSHA’s regulations 
require an investigation to be completed within 60 days.  See 29 C.F.R. § 1980.105 (2006). 
215 Discussion with Nilgun Tolek, Director, OSHA Office of Investigative Assistance 
(Jan. 29, 2007). 
216 See id.; see also Deborah Solomon, For Financial Whistle-Blowers, New Shield Is an 
Imperfect One, WALL ST. J., May 19, 2005, at A1, A14 (reporting that OSHA investigators 
acknowledge that OSHA is “struggling with the new mandate” from Sarbanes-Oxley). 
217 See Solomon, supra note 216, at A14. 
218 See OSHA, WHISTLEBLOWER INVESTIGATIVE MANUAL 3-2; 3-3 (Aug. 22, 2003), avail-
able at http://www.osha.gov/dep/oia/whistleblower/index.html (last visited Jan. 31, 
2007). 
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section explains that a “nexus” must be found between a whistleblower’s 
protected activity and the adverse employment action, and the section 
describes the employer’s rebuttal as requiring proof by a preponderance 
of the evidence.219 Although the specific chapter on Sarbanes-Oxley uses 
the proper “contributing factor” and “clear and convincing” standards, 
this section does not elaborate on the differences between this language 
and the language of the Occupational Safety and Health Act.220 OSHA’s 
investigative manual could easily mislead OSHA’s investigators as to the 
true nature of Sarbanes-Oxley’s unique burden of proof structure. 
Moreover, employers have several procedural advantages that may 
explain OSHA’s willingness to accept an employer’s explanation for an 
adverse employment action.  OSHA does not have subpoena power and 
therefore cannot force employers to provide documents or witnesses to 
testify.221 OSHA regulations allow employers to meet with investigators 
and dispute OSHA’s conclusions, but employees do not have these same 
rights.222 Prior to April 2006, employees did not necessarily receive the 
employer’s response to the complaint, even though employers received a 
copy of the employee’s complaint.223 Employers also can specifically 
request that OSHA withhold confidential information from employees 
during and after the investigation.224
The way in which OSHA resolves cases involving factual disputes 
may reflect these investigative issues.  When deciding against employees 
so frequently in these “factual rationale” cases, OSHA closely evaluates 
the employee’s own behavior, which the employer likely emphasized 
during the investigation.  Two evidentiary determinations seem to have 
particularly influenced OSHA investigators.  First, in over one-half of the 
cases citing a factual rationale in favor of the employer (51.1%), OSHA 
found that the employee engaged in improper behavior, such as insubor-
dination or illegal activity.225 Second, in 43.6% of these “factual rationale” 
cases, OSHA found that the employee suffered an adverse employment 
 
219 See id. 
220 See id. at 14-2. 
221 See Solomon, supra note 216, at A1.  By contrast, Congress provided OSHA with 
subpoena power to fulfill OSHA’s obligations under the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act.  See 29 U.S.C. § 657(b). 
222 See 29 C.F.R. § 1980.104(e) (2006); Solomon, supra note 216, at A14. 
223 On April 11, 2006, OSHA revised its investigative procedures.  OSHA now states 
that “[d]uring an investigation, disclosure must be made to the complainant of at least the 
substance of the respondent’s response.  Other evidence submitted by the respondent (or 
the substance of it) may also be disclosed, so that the complainant can fully respond to the 
respondent’s position and the investigation can proceed to a final resolution.  The form 
and timing of the disclosure are at OSHA’s discretion.”  OSHA, REVISED INTERIM GUIDE-
LINES ON CHANGES IN PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING PRIVACY ACT FILES AND FREEDOM OF 
INFORMATION ACT REQUESTS § II.A.2 (Apr. 11, 2006), available at 
http://www.osha.gov/dep/oia/whistleblower/Revised_interim_guidelines.html (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2007). 
224 See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1980.104(c); (d) (2006); Solomon, supra note 216, at A14.   
225 A complete table of important evidentiary factors cited by OSHA or ALJs to sup-
port a decision for an employer can be found on the author’s website:  
http://law.unl.edu/inside.asp?d=faculty&id=28.  
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action because of poor performance rather than as a result of retalia-
tion.226 
The importance of these two types of factual findings—bad em-
ployee behavior and poor performance—are not surprising.  It is well-
documented that a typical reaction of employers to retaliation suits by 
whistleblowers is to attack the whistleblower’s behavior.227 In fact, by 
definition, a whistleblower in a retaliation lawsuit suffered some sort of 
adverse employment action that the employer must justify.   
But, OSHA rarely cited other possible evidentiary facts in support of 
its decision, or at least OSHA failed to discuss additional facts in its 
decision-letters.  For example, in these factual rationale cases, OSHA’s 
decision-letters rarely discussed witness credibility (2.1%), the timing of 
the adverse action in relation to the protected activity (4.3%), or whether 
the employer followed its normal procedures in disciplining the em-
ployee (4.3%).228 Furthermore, OSHA decisions only occasionally 
discussed whether the employee claimed to treat the whistleblowers 
similarly to the rest of its employees (14.9%) or whether the employee’s 
discharge occurred as part of a reduction-in-force (10.6%).229 OSHA’s 
heavy reliance on the employee’s behavior in justifying its decision, while 
underutilizing other potential evidence related to an employer’s actions 
and policies, seems to support the conclusion that OSHA did not fully 
investigate and evaluate both sides of a dispute.  OSHA seemed merely to 
accept the employer’s position, perhaps because the employee was not as 
involved in the investigation. 
By comparison, employees may have won factual cases at the ALJ 
Level more frequently than at the OSHA Level because ALJs have the 
luxury of hearing full testimony from both sides, complete with de-
meanor evidence of witnesses and cross-examination.  For example, the 
credibility of a witness played an important role at the ALJ Level while 
this factor was almost irrelevant at the OSHA Level: in 75% of the “fac-
tual rationale” cases won by the employer at the ALJ Level, ALJs relied 
on the credibility of the witnesses to make a decision, as compared to 
2.1% at the OSHA Level.230 Similarly, in all five employee wins resulting 
from an ALJ hearing, the ALJ cited “witness credibility” as a factor in 
deciding in favor of the employee.  Only 41.7% of the OSHA employee 
wins recognized this factor as important in OSHA’s decision.231 
226 See id. 
227 See, e.g., Bruce D. Fisher, The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989: A False Hope for 
Whistleblowers, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 355, 364 (1991). 
228 A complete table of important evidentiary factors cited by OSHA or ALJs to sup-
port a decision for an employer can be found on the author’s website:  
http://law.unl.edu/inside.asp?d=faculty&id=28.   
229 See id. 
230 See id. It is important to remember that the raw numbers of factual rationale 
cases at the ALJ Level are quite small.  
231 A complete table of important evidentiary factors cited by OSHA or ALJs to sup-
port a decision for an employee can be found on the author’s website:  
http://law.unl.edu/inside.asp?d=faculty&id=28.   
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4. Conclusion—Narrow Boundaries and a High Burden 
The results of the present study indicate that OSHA and the ALJs 
failed to fulfill employees’ expectations of broad protections in the initial 
years after the Act’s enactment.  Employers consistently won Sarbanes-
Oxley cases because OSHA and the ALJs found that employees failed to 
present claims within the legal parameters of the Act.   
Part of the explanation for this low win rate could be that employees 
filed frivolous or borderline claims that clearly did not fall within the 
Act’s boundaries.232 This explanation suggests that the employee win rate 
should increase as employees and their attorneys learn from these out-
comes and file fewer cases requiring a broad reading of the Act.  The use 
of procedural and boundary rationales should decrease and factual ra-
tionales (and employee wins) should increase as attorneys and employees 
determine where administrative decision-makers draw the parameters of 
the Act. 
However, the study’s results contradict these predictions.  During 
the course of the study, procedural and boundary rationales did not 
decrease over time.  In fact, as seen in Chart 2 below, the trend at the 
OSHA Level was to resolve increasingly more cases over time by using 
boundary rationales, perhaps following the lead of the ALJs.  With regard 
to the ALJs, Chart 3 demonstrates that there was no discernable decline in 
the use of either procedural and boundary rationales over time.   
Moreover, recent statistics provided by OSHA demonstrate that no 
employee won any of the 159 cases that OSHA resolved during Fiscal 
Year 2006, which ended on September 30, 2006.233 This lack of employee 
victories four years after the Act’s enactment suggest explanations other 
than a stubborn insistence of employees and their attorneys to file non-
meritorious claims.  Indeed, the study demonstrates that OSHA and the 
ALJs particularly focused on two new legal boundaries to whistleblower 
law implemented by Sarbanes-Oxley: a new definition of a “covered 
employer” and a new type of “protected activity”.  Qualitative evidence 
from ALJ decisions regarding these topics demonstrate that ALJs often 
interpreted these new boundaries narrowly.  All of these results suggest 
that, even if employees filed some cases requiring a broad reading of the 
Act, OSHA and the ALJs also contributed to the low employee win rate 
by strictly construing the legal boundaries of Sarbanes-Oxley.  Such 
discrepancies between a whistleblower’s expectations regarding the Act’s 
 
232 Indeed, to explain the low employee win rate, OSHA posited the theory that 
early Sarbanes-Oxley employees pushed the outer boundaries of the Act.  See Discussion 
with Nilgun Tolek, Director, OSHA Office of Investigative Assistance (Oct. 3, 2006); E-
mail from Nilgun Tolek, Director, OSHA Office of Investigative Assistance to Richard 
Moberly, Asst. Prof. of Law, Univ. of Neb. College of Law (July 11, 2005) (on file with 
author); cf. Michael Selmi, Why are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 
61 LA. L. REV. 555, 567 (2001) (asserting that claims on the “outer perimeter” of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act may “represent a natural evolution of a new and innovative 
statute that left much room for interpretation”); Colker, Winning, supra note 15, at 258-265 
(exploring this thesis with data from ADA appellate cases). 
233 See E-mail from Nilgun Tolek, Director, OSHA Office of Investigative Assistance, 
to Richard Moberly, Asst. Prof. of Law, Univ. of Neb. College of Law (Oct. 3, 2006) (on file 
with author). 
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applicability and how the Act actually was applied likely caused a sub-
stantially lower win rate than might otherwise be expected.234 
Chart 2 - Rationales Used By OSHA Over Time 
Chart 3 - Rationales Used by ALJs Over Time 
 
Moreover, even for cases that did fall within the strict boundaries of 
Sarbanes-Oxley, OSHA failed to fulfill employees’ expectations for pro-
tection based upon the Act’s employee-friendly burden of proof.  
Employers won almost 90% of these “factual” cases in front of OSHA, 
indicating that OSHA failed to properly apply the Act’s burden-shifting 
requirements.235 OSHA seemed more willing than the ALJs to delve into 
messy factual issues, but when OSHA did evaluate the factual merits of a 
case, employees rarely won.   
 
234 See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 122, at 590 (“[A]nother type of powerful 
explanation of aberrant win rates is the parties’ mutual misperceptions about the prevail-
ing standard of decision.”). 
235 See supra text accompanying notes 211-14. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
An employee who files a Sarbanes-Oxley claim faces a steeper up-hill 
battle than most employees asserting claims against an employer under 
comparable employee statutes.236 Simply put, Sarbanes-Oxley does not 
protect employee whistleblowers to the extent Congress envisioned when 
it passed the Act.  This Part presents three suggestions to remedy this 
under-enforcement of a statute Congress intended to provide broad 
remedial relief and encouragement to whistleblowers. 
First, Congress should increase the Act’s statute of limitations from 
90 to at least 180 days.  Second, Congress should address OSHA’s and the 
ALJs' emphasis on “boundary” issues either by broadening the Act’s 
boundaries to include more types of claims or by clarifying that it in-
tended the Act to have the narrow application currently being imposed 
by these administrative decision-makers.  Third, Congress should attend 
to OSHA’s inappropriate application of Sarbanes-Oxley’s employee-
friendly burden of proof either by giving OSHA more resources to inves-
tigate Sarbanes-Oxley complaints thoroughly or by eliminating OSHA’s 
role as principal investigator of these claims.   
A. Amending the Statute of Limitations Procedural Hurdle 
The study’s results indicate that OSHA and ALJs denied large num-
bers of whistleblowers Sarbanes-Oxley protection because of the 
restrictive 90-day statute of limitations.  In almost half of the ALJ statute 
of limitations cases (46.4%, or 13 out of 28 cases), employees filed Sar-
banes-Oxley claims between 90 and 180 days after an adverse action.237 
This large number of cases highlights a significant procedural obstacle for 
employees.   
A longer filing period would enable OSHA or an ALJ to hear the 
merits of these claims.  Moreover, most employees who filed Sarbanes-
Oxley claims alleged that they lost their jobs.238 Additional time to file 
claims would provide whistleblowers the ability to first take care of other, 
more pressing responsibilities, such as finding another job and dealing 
with the upheaval of losing a primary source of income.  Furthermore, 
more than 90 days should be provided for a whistleblower to locate a 
competent attorney and for the attorney to investigate a claim thoroughly 
before filing with the Department of Labor.   
A longer limitations period also would ameliorate the drastic conse-
quences resulting from any confusion regarding the beginning of 
limitations period.  Such confusion may result from the well-enforced 
 
236 See discussion supra Part IV.A (comparing win rates with other employment 
statutes); see also supra Table 2. 
237 See, e.g., Stone v. Duke Energy Corp., 2006-SOX-48, at 3 (Dep’t of Labor Apr. 7, 
2006) (filed 92 days after adverse action); Stevenson v. Vertex Pharm., Inc., 2006-SOX-56, 
at 2 (Dep’t of Labor May 8, 2006 (95 days).  OSHA decisions either did not contain this 
data or, if a decision did indicate the number of days between the retaliation and the 
filing, OSHA redacted that data under an exception to the Freedom of Information Act. 
238 The study found that 81.8% (378/462) of Complainants whose allegation regard-
ing retaliation was discernable alleged that they were fired from their jobs as retaliation. 
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rule that the statute of limitations begins running when the employee has 
notice of an adverse action, rather than when the action occurs239—a rule 
that can lead to disputes regarding when such notice was received and 
whether the notice was clear.  Disputes about notice seem more likely 
when the limitations period is shorter, because the few days or weeks 
between notice and an actual adverse employment action become crucial 
with a shorter statute of limitations. 
Lengthening the statute of limitations should not negatively impact 
the ability of an employer to defend itself.  Many employment statutes 
have limitations periods of 180 days or more, and employers have not 
had difficulty marshalling evidence to defend themselves.240 In fact, 
various federal statutes require most employers to keep certain records 
on employees for one year or more, resulting in the typical practice of 
maintaining an employee’s file for at least this period of time.241 
No compelling rationale for a 90-day limitations period appears in 
the literature on labor relations, employee rights, or whistleblowing.  In 
fact, the original version of the Sarbanes-Oxley contained a 180-day 
statute of limitations.242 When the Senate Judiciary Committee consid-
ered the original bill, Senators Grassley and Leahy offered an 
amendment, apparently to mollify a group of Republican senators.243 The 
amendment weakened a number of key whistleblower provisions, includ-
ing reducing the statute of limitations to 90 days.244 
While a statute of limitations is obviously necessary, the short dura-
tion of Sarbanes-Oxley’s current limitations period is unrelated to the 
Act’s goals of deterring corporate fraud and remedying retaliation against 
whistleblowers.  Significant numbers of whistleblowers have been pre-
vented from asserting potentially valid claims because this procedural 
requirement is too restrictive.  Given the complex nature of these cases, 
 
239 See supra text accompanying note 142. 
240 See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) 
(300 days if charge is first instituted with state or local agency; otherwise 180 days); 
Americans With Disabilities Act §107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (incorporating Title VII’s 
statute of limitations); Age Discrimination in Employment Act § 7(d), 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) 
(either 180 or 300 days if state law provides relief for age discrimination); Fair Labor 
Standards Act (two or three years, depending on employer intent); Surface Transportation 
Assistance Act, 49 U.S.C. § 31105(b) (180 days); Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002, 
49 U.S.C. § 60129(b)(1) (180 days).  The Government Accountability Project suggests that a 
“realistic” statute of limitations is an essential provision for an anti-retaliation statute to 
provide true protection for whistleblowers.  See Testimony of Tom Devine, Legal Director, 
Government Accountability Project, for the Working Group on Probity and Public Ethics, Organi-
zation of American States (Mar. 31, 2000), available at 
http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/tom_devine.htm.  Specifically, the GAP suggests 
that a “one year statute of limitations is consistent with common law rights and has 
proved functional.”  See id. 
241 See 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14 (2006) (EEOC regulation requiring employers to maintain 
certain employment records for at least one year); 29 C.F.R. § 516.5 (2006) (Department of 
Labor regulations requiring employers to maintain payroll and other wage records for 
three years). 
242 See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 22, 26 (2002); S. 2010, § 7(a). 
243 See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 22, 26 (2002); S. 2010, § 7(a) (indicating the group of 
senators to include Senators Hatch, Thurmond, Grassley, Kyl, DeWine, Sessions, Brown-
back, and McConnell). 
244 See CONG. REC. S1789-90 (Mar. 12, 2002). 
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and the reluctance of OSHA, ALJs and the ARB to consider equitable 
relief from the requirements of the statute of limitations, Congress should 
amend Sarbanes-Oxley to provide for a limitations period of a minimum 
of 180 days. 
B. Broadening and Clarifying the Act’s Boundaries 
The study’s results also indicate that the administrative review proc-
ess focused intensely on the legal boundaries of a Sarbanes-Oxley 
claim.245 Administrative decision-makers concentrated on two “bound-
ary” issues: the “covered company” and the “protected activity” 
requirements for a prima facie case.  These decision-makers interpreted 
each of these provisions in ways that overly restricted whistleblower 
claims.   
Rigid and narrow interpretations of the Act seem inappropriate 
given the Act’s remedial goals and the necessity of employee whistle-
blowers to reveal corporate fraud.246 A “model” whistleblower statute—
one that maximizes encouragement and protection of whistleblowers—
should protect a broad range of whistleblowers and disclosures.247 The 
current interpretations of the Act do not attain these goals, because they 
narrow the scope of protected disclosures and, by strictly construing the 
type of employee covered by the Act, seem to focus inordinately on the 
whistleblower rather than the disclosure being made.248 Accordingly, 
Congress could amend the Act to address these strict constructions of the 
Act’s language by broadening the types of companies subject to the Act 
and the type of employee activities protected by the Act.  This broader 
language, set forth in more detail below, would clarify the Act’s goals of 
encouraging whistleblowers to report a variety of wrongdoing and pro-
tecting them after they do. 
On the other hand, extending protections as I suggest may arguably 
broaden the scope of the anti-retaliation provision beyond Sarbanes-
Oxley’s general focus on fraud at publicly-traded companies.  To the 
extent Congress desires to maintain a narrower focus on a single issue, 
i.e., fraud, at only certain companies, i.e., those that are publicly-traded, I 
also make alternative suggestions to clarify the Act’s narrow boundaries 
by requiring more disclosure from OSHA and the ALJs regarding the 
limited protections of the Act.  By clarifying the Act’s boundaries in this 
manner, Congress could help temper employees’ expectations about the 
seemingly broad coverage of the Act. 
 
245 See supra Table 5. 
246 See Moberly, supra note 1, at 1116-17 (discussing the importance of employees as 
corporate monitors).  
247 See Robert G. Vaughn, et al., The Whistleblower Statute Prepared for the Organization 
of American States and the Global Legal Revolution Protecting Whistleblowers, 35 GEO. WASH.
INT’L L. REV. 857, 865 (2003) (discussing various provisions of a “model” whistleblower 
statute). 
248 See id. at 864 (asserting that a model whistleblower statute should focus on the 
disclosure made by the whistleblower, not the whistleblower). 
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1. Broadening the Definition of a “Covered Employer” 
ALJs and the ARB strictly construed the definition of “covered em-
ployer.”  First, as discussed above,249 ALJs and the ARB imposed onerous 
requirements for employees to bring Sarbanes-Oxley claims against 
privately-held subsidiaries of publicly-traded companies.  For example, 
under these decisions, employees must pierce the corporate veil in order 
to bring a claim against a privately-held subsidiary.  Yet, this requirement 
ignores the law’s treatment of subsidiaries as “agents” of publicly-traded 
companies for accounting and financial reporting purposes.250 Subsidiar-
ies “are an integral part of the publicly traded company, inseparable from 
it for purposes of evaluating the integrity of its financial information, and 
they must be treated as such.”251 A parent company’s internal corporate 
controls must include providing a subsidiary’s material financial informa-
tion to the parent company’s officers, who are required to certify the 
parent’s annual or quarterly reports.252 For Sarbanes-Oxley purposes, at 
least, a “publicly traded corporation is . . . the sum of its constituent 
units,” including any privately-held subsidiaries.253 Thus, concluded one 
ALJ, “the scope of Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower protection tracks the 
flow of financial and accounting information throughout the corporate 
structure and remains as permeable to the internal ‘corporate veils’ as the 
financial information itself.”254 By contrast, other ALJ decisions and the 
ARB’s recent opinion requiring the piercing of the corporate veil seem 
misguided in light of this persuasive reasoning equating whistleblower 
protection with other corporate reporting reforms enacted by Sarbanes-
Oxley.   
Second, ALJs uniformly held that privately-held companies that 
serve as contractors of publicly-traded companies are not “covered enti-
ties” under Sarbanes-Oxley, and therefore cannot be liable under the 
 
249 See discussion supra Part IV.B.2. 
250 Morefield v. Exelon Servs., Inc., 2004-SOX-2, at 3 (Dep’t of Labor Jan. 28, 2004). 
251 Id. 
252 See id. (citing to Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 302(a)(4)(B)). 
253 Id. at 4.  As put by one ALJ in a Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower case: 
The publicly traded entity is not a free-floating apex. When its value and 
performance is based, in part, on the value and performance of component 
entities within its organization, the statute ensures that those entities are 
subject to internal controls applicable throughout the corporate structure, 
that they are subject to the oversight responsibility of the audit committee, 
and that the officers who sign the financials are aware of material informa-
tion relating to the subsidiaries. A publicly traded corporation is, for 
Sarbanes-Oxley purposes, the sum of its constituent units; and Congress 
insisted upon accuracy and integrity in financial reporting at all levels of 
the corporate structure, including the non-publicly traded subsidiaries. In 
this context, the law recognizes as an obstacle no internal corporate barriers 
to the remedies Congress deemed necessary. It imposed reforms upon the 
publicly traded company, and through it, to its entire corporate organiza-
tion. 
Id. 
254 Id. at 4. 
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Act.255 The ALJs interpreted the Act’s language to mean that an “officer, 
employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent” of a publicly-traded com-
pany may not retaliate against an employee of the public company.256 
According to the ALJs, the Act’s anti-retaliation protections do not extend 
to employees of contractors, subcontractors, and agents unless the con-
tractor, subcontractor, or agent is itself a public company.257 Based on 
such a limited interpretation of the Act’s language, ALJs dismissed a 
number of cases without addressing the factual merits of whether an 
employee was retaliated against for engaging in protected activity.258
ALJs’ unwillingness to apply the Act directly to employees of “con-
tractors, subcontractors, and agents,” also appears unnecessary and 
contrary to Congressional intent.  As Professor Robert Vaughn has ar-
gued, the Act’s use of the term “employee” not only could mean an 
employee of a public company, but also could include coverage for em-
ployees of a contractor, subcontractor, or agent of a public company.259 
Professor Vaughn noted that when Congress wants to limit the coverage 
of a whistleblower statute to certain employees it does so very clearly.260 
For example, the AIR21 statute (on which much of Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
procedural requirements are based) specifically refers to discrimination 
against “airline employees,” while Sarbanes-Oxley does not contain such 
an express limitation.261 
A prominent whistleblower advocate made a similar argument for a 
broad reading of “covered employer” to include non-publicly traded 
corporations that have a contractual or agency relationship with publicly- 
traded corporations.  Stephen Kohn of the National Whistleblower Center 
asserted that this interpretation “is consistent with the case law devel-
oped under other whistleblower laws.”262 Specifically, under the Energy 
Reorganization Act, ALJs found suppliers and vendors of formally cov-
ered companies to be covered employers.263 
The Act’s statutory language, then, permits a broader interpretation 
of a “covered employer” than ALJs and OSHA currently utilize.  A 
broader interpretation also furthers Sarbanes-Oxley’s policy goals.  Pro-
fessor Vaughn astutely noted that an employee of a contractor can be 
“well-placed to discover fraud and abuse by the [public] company” and 
public companies should not be able to pressure contractors, subcontrac-
tors, and agents to retaliate against this employee.”264 Although 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s administrative decision-makers have not interpreted 
 
255 See Goodman v. Decisive Analytics Corp., 2006-SOX-11, at 9 (Dep’t of Labor Jan. 
10, 2006); Minkina v. Affiliated Physician’s Group, 2005-SOX-19, at 6 (Dep’t of Labor Feb. 
22, 2005); Roulett v. American Capital Access, 2004-SOX-78, at 9 (Dep’t of Labor Dec. 22, 
2004). 
256 See cases cited in footnote 255 supra.
257 See id. 
258 See id. 
259 Vaughn, supra note 8, at 9. 
260 See id. 
261 See id. 
262 KOHN, supra note 8, at 70. 
263 Id. (citing In re Five Star Products, Inc., CLI-93-23, M&O of NRC Commission, 38 
NRC 169 (Oct. 21, 1993)). 
264 Vaughn, supra note 8, at 10. 
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the Act in this manner, a reasonable interpretation of Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
language is that Congress wanted to protect employees of these contrac-
tors, subcontractors, and agents, given the role of several such employees 
in “enabling or condoning corruption and fraud.”265 Moreover, the re-
sults from fraud at privately-held companies can be as devastating to the 
companies’ employees, owners, and suppliers as fraud at a publicly-
traded corporation.   
At a minimum, drawing technical distinctions between publicly-
traded and privately-held companies in both the subsidiary and the 
contractor scenarios creates employee confusion regarding whether a 
potential whistleblower will be protected from retaliation.  This confusion 
can only lead to inconsistent enforcement of the Act and therefore less 
whistleblower disclosure.  At its most dangerous, such distinctions pro-
vide a free pass for privately-held corporations to retaliate against any 
employee who reports internal misconduct.  If Sarbanes-Oxley aims to 
reduce corporate fraud, then protecting only employees of publicly-
traded corporations undermines that goal.   
Thus, Congress could reconsider whether the protections received by 
an employee should hinge on the vagaries of the corporate decision to  
publicly-trade its shares.  A more commonly-utilized distinction in em-
ployment law is for statutes to cover employers with a definable number 
of employees, such as Title VII’s fifteen-employee minimum.266 Indeed, 
Sarbanes-Oxley could achieve similar coverage with less ambiguous 
language by relying on the number of employees as a proxy for publicly-
traded companies.  In order to avoid overly burdening employers, Con-
gress could set the number of employees required for coverage at the 
same minimum set by the Family and Medical Leave Act, which provides 
the largest minimum of any federal employment statute: the FMLA 
covers employers with 50 or more employees within a 75 mile radius of a 
work site.267 This requirement will be both over- and under-inclusive, in 
that it will exclude small publicly-traded companies and include large 
privately-held companies.  However, it would provide more certainty 
regarding coverage because employees may better understand this crite-
ria commonly utilized by other employee-protection statutes.   
Moreover, the harm from corporate fraud results more from the size 
of the company than from whether the company is publicly-traded or 
privately-held.  Large corporations can be the economic centers of a 
community, regardless of their corporate form, and corporate fraud 
harms these communities—not just corporate shareholders.268 Publicly-
traded companies have attempted to avoid the regulations of Sarbanes-
 
265 Id. 
266 See Title VII of the Civil rights Act of 1964 § 701(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (15 em-
ployees); see also Americans With Disabilities Act § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (15 
employees); Age Discrimination in Employment Act § 11(b), 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (20 em-
ployees).  It should be noted that several whistleblower protections do not require a 
minimum number of employees.  Instead, these statutory anti-retaliation provisions 
protect employees from retaliation by any “person,” including employers of any size.  See, 
e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act § 11(c), 29 U.S.C. § 660(c). 
267 See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2) (defining eligible employees); id. § 2611(d) (defining cov-
ered employers). 
268 See Moberly, supra note 1, at 1164-65. 
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Oxley by becoming privately-held,269 yet the public costs of fraud at 
private companies remains significant, including the costs of lost jobs and 
unemployed workers on a community.  Furthermore, privately-held 
companies have fewer internal controls than publicly-traded companies, 
which may make them more susceptible to fraud.  Thus, encouraging 
whistleblowers by protecting them in privately-held corporations reduces 
the chance of fraud in the very places it is most likely to occur. 
In short, covering employers with a certain number of employees 
would make Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower protection less dependent 
on the corporate form taken by an employer and would clarify the appli-
cation of the Act.  At the same time, the Act would cover the country’s 
largest companies, where the overarching problem of corporate fraud has 
the greatest impact. 
2. Broadening the Scope of “Protected Activity”   
The Act’s coverage of “protected activities” also could be broadly 
construed.  The statutes that the Act identifies as proper subjects for 
whistleblower disclosures cover a particularly broad swath of activities.  
The criminal code provisions identified by Sarbanes-Oxley as topics for 
protected whistleblower disclosures “include some of the broadest and 
most widely used provisions of the federal criminal law.”270 The protec-
tion of disclosure related to conduct that violates “’any rule or regulation 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission’ . . . may permit the coverage 
of some disclosures not clearly encompassed by a purely economic defini-
tion of materiality under the securities laws.”271 Furthermore, by 
protecting “any” law “relating to” fraud against shareholders, the Act 
protects disclosures about not only securities laws, but also “any other 
federal law that relates to the ability of shareholders to protect themselves 
against fraud, such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.”272 In other 
words, as Professor Vaughn argues, whistleblower disclosures about 
matters “well beyond accounting fraud” should be protected,273 including  
disclosures of misconduct as diverse as health and safety vio-
lations, the suppression of information regarding product 
risks, environmental misconduct, consumer fraud, false 
claims against the government, disregard of statutes requir-
ing the disclosure of information to federal regulatory 
agencies, violations of federal anti-discrimination laws, viola-
tions of statutes and rules protective of labor, conspiracies to 
break the antitrust laws, [and] bribery of public officials, in-
cluding foreign officials, and human rights abuses.274 
269 See Deborah Solomon, At What Price?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2005, at R3. 
270 See Vaughn, supra note 8, at 22 (citing sections 1341, 1343, 1344 and 1348 of Title 
18 of the United States Code). 
271 See id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (Supp. 2004)). 
272 See id. at 23. 
273 See id. at 46. 
274 See id. at 22-23. 
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Recent ARB decisions, however, rejected a broad interpretation and 
reinforced the ALJs’ narrow interpretations of “protected activity,” thus 
likely making the road steeper for future whistleblowers.  First, the ARB 
required a whistleblower’s disclosure to “definitely and specifically” 
relate to the listed categories of fraud or securities violations under 18 
U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1).275 In Platone v. FLYi, Inc., the ARB interpreted the 
Act to mean that whistleblower disclosures regarding mail or wire fraud 
were insufficient, by themselves, to constitute “protected activity”; rather, 
the ARB read into the Act a requirement that the fraudulent conduct 
reported also had to specifically “be of a type that would be adverse to 
investors’ interests.”276 This additional requirement does not appear in 
the Act’s statutory language, which seems to protect the disclosure of any 
mail or wire fraud, not just fraud related to shareholders. 
Second, in a different case, the ARB specifically found that a “mere 
possibility that a challenged practice could adversely affect the financial 
condition of a corporation, and that the effect on the financial condition 
could in turn be intentionally withheld from investors, is not enough” to 
satisfy the “protected activity” requirement.277 The ARB also seemed to 
require, at the time a whistleblower makes a disclosure, that the whistle-
blower specifically identify the statute violated by the activities the 
whistleblower reports and connect the statute to Sarbanes-Oxley’s provi-
sions.278 Yet, even though some rank-and-file employees, such as 
bookkeepers or office managers, are in position to identify and report 
financial wrongdoing, the assumption that these same employees would 
have such specific and detailed legal knowledge is unwarranted. 
Third, the ARB limited the Act’s “protected activity” requirement by 
examining Sarbanes-Oxley’s mandate that the employee whistleblower 
“reasonably believe” that the corporate activity disclosed violated one of 
the named statutes.  In Allen v. Stewart Enterprises, the ARB indicated that 
a “reasonable belief” that a statute has been violated means a high cer-
tainty that the law has been broken.279 In that case, the employee alleged 
that she examined “internal consolidated financial statements” and that 
these statements indicated that the company violated an SEC rule.280 The 
ARB, however, found that her disclosure of this potential SEC rule viola-
tion was not protected because these internal reports did not have to be 
filed with the SEC, and therefore could not have violated the rule.281 
Accordingly, the ARB found that the employee could not have “reasona-
bly believed” that a violation of the rule occurred.282 
275 See Platone v. FLYi, Inc., No. 04-154, at 17 (ARB Sept. 29, 2006). 
276 See id. at 15. 
277 Harvey v. Home Depot, No. 04-114, at 15 (ARB June 2, 2006); see also Platone, No. 
04-154, at 22 (finding that a reasonable shareholder would not find the potential loss of 
$1,500.00 to be “material,” and therefore finding that a whistleblower who reported such a 
loss would not be protected under the Act). 
278 See Allen v. Stewart Enterp., No. 06-081, at 12 (ARB July 27, 2006); Reddy v. 
Medquist, No. 04-123, at 8-9 (ARB Sept. 30, 2005). 
279 See Allen, No. 06-081, at 14. 
280 See id. 
281 See id. 
282 See id. 
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Fourth, in Getman v. Southwest Securities, the ARB determined that re-
fusing to engage in illegal activity is not protected activity under the 
Act.283 In July 2005, the ARB reversed an ALJ decision in favor of an 
employee who alleged that she refused to engage in illegal activity—in 
that case changing a stock rating.284 The ARB found that merely refusing 
to break the law, rather than affirmatively reporting violations of the law 
to a person with supervisory authority, cannot be deemed true whistle-
blowing protected by the Act.285 Although the ARB acknowledged that 
“there may be times where only refusal is sufficient to provide informa-
tion,” and thus would be protected activity, the facts in the case before it 
did not satisfy that requirement.286 Accordingly, employees who refuse 
to engage in illegal activity must also demonstrate that their refusal 
communicates to a person with supervisory authority that the employer’s 
conduct violates the law.287 
This decision undermines a long tradition of interpreting both statu-
tory whistleblower protections and the common law of wrongful 
discharge to protect an employee who refuses to engage in illegal activ-
ity.288 The impact of this decision on employees may be substantial.  In 
the study, a substantial number of successful employees alleged that 
Sarbanes-Oxley protected their refusal to engage in illegal activity.  
Among all employees, only 8.7% (40/462) made this claim.289 However, 
considerably more of the successful employees made this claim in addition 
to claiming that they actually provided information about illegal activity 
to another person: 60% at the ALJ Level, and 30.8% at the OSHA Level.290 
The ARB’s decision in Getman dismantles this avenue of protected whis-
tleblowing. 
These problems are more inscrutable than the “covered entity” prob-
lem because of the type of anti-retaliation protection provided by 
Sarbanes-Oxley.  The Act follows the general federal model of using 
statutory whistleblower protections to protect only certain disclosures 
related to the substantive aims of a particular statute.  Sarbanes-Oxley 
specifically aims at disclosures related to corporate fraud.  Other exam-
ples of such limited federal protection include the Energy Reorganization 
Act, aimed at disclosures related to nuclear safety,291 the Occupational 
 
283 See No. 04-059 (ARB July 29, 2005). 
284 See id. at 9-10. 
285 See id. 
286 See id. at 10. 
287 See id. 
288 See, e.g., Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 255 (1987) (interpreting the 
Surface Transportation Assistance Act to protect an employee who refused to operate a 
motor vehicle that did not comply with safety regulations); Petermann v. Intern’l Brother-
hood of Teamsters Local 396, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1959) (refusing to commit perjury); Harless 
v. First Nat’l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W.Va. 1978) (refusing to violate a consumer credit 
code); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330 (1980) (refusing to 
participate in illegal price fixing scheme). 
289 Forty out of 462 complainants whose allegations were discernable claimed to 
have refused to engage in illegal activity (8.7%).  Three out of five successful ALJ com-
plainants (60.0%) and four out of 13 successful OSHA complainants (30.8%) made this 
claim. 
290 See id. 
291 See 42 U.S.C. § 5851. 
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Safety and Health Act, aimed at disclosures related to workplace safety 
and health,292 and AIR21, geared towards protecting whistleblowers who 
report problems with airline safety.293 
By tying the protection an employee receives to whether the em-
ployee disclosed information about a “protected” topic, Sarbanes-Oxley 
puts enormous consequences on the ability of an employee to frame a 
whistleblower disclosure in the terms presented by the Act.  It also pre-
sents an easy target for employers or administrative decision-makers to 
limit the Act’s coverage by forcing employees to make an unreasonably 
specific whistleblowing disclosure or to hold an unrealistic understand-
ing of the law. 
Thus, this federal model always depends upon difficult line-drawing 
as long as the aim of whistleblower protection is to encourage only whis-
tleblower disclosures regarding specific topics, such as fraud or 
workplace safety.  In the case of Sarbanes-Oxley, this problem may be 
more pronounced because of the broad applicability of the statute across 
industries as compared to other whistleblower provisions that are aimed 
at specific industries.294 Additionally, the Act’s goal of preventing 
“shareholder fraud” appears more ambiguous and open-ended than 
other topics, such as workplace health and safety.295 Furthermore, Sar-
banes-Oxley’s broad language implies that Congress prefers protection 
for disclosure of a broader range of misconduct. 
Accordingly, “protected activity” could be redefined specifically to 
include the reporting of misconduct that goes beyond reporting only 
corporate fraud.  California’s and New Jersey’s whistleblower protection 
statutes, for example, protect corporate whistleblowers who report any 
illegal activity, such as a violation of a statute, rule, or regulation.296 At 
the federal level, the National Whistleblower Center proposed legislation 
that would broadly protect corporate whistleblowers in the same man-
ner.297 Internationally, model whistleblower statutes developed by 
whistleblower scholars in conjunction with the Office of Legal Coopera-
tion of the Organization of American States contain similarly protective 
provisions,298 as do statutes applicable to private sector employees in 
Great Britain,299 Canada,300 and South Africa.301 Given the difficulty 
employees have had penetrating the boundaries of Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
limited “protected activity” requirement, these explicitly-broad protec-
tions warrant further consideration by Congress.  An expansion and 
 
292 See 29 U.S.C. § 660(c). 
293 See 42 U.S.C. § 42121. 
294 See, e.g., The Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (aimed at the nuclear 
power industry); AIR21, 42 U.S.C. § 42121 (aimed at airline industry). 
295 Cf. Occupational Safety and Health Act § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 651(b). 
296 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3. 
297 See National Whistleblower Protection Act Proposal, at 
http://www.whistleblowers.org/html/model_whistleblower_law.html; see also Cherry, 
supra note 8, at 1085, 1121 (recommending the proposal from the National Whistleblower 
Center). 
298 See Vaughn, et al., supra note 247, at 859, 865-66. 
299 See id. at 891-92 (discussing the Public Interest Disclosure Act of 1998). 
300 See id. at 882 (discussing the New Brunswick Employment Standards Act). 
301 See id. at 893-94 (discussing the South African Public Disclosures Act). 
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simplification of the “protected activity” requirement should reduce the 
tendency among administrative decision-makers to strictly construe 
whether a whistleblower deserves protection based upon the type of 
disclosure made.  The focus of the administrative decision-maker could 
shift from the disclosures of the whistleblower to the retaliatory actions of 
the employer.302 
3. Clarifying the Act’s Boundaries 
Suggestions to broaden whistleblower protections such as I propose 
inevitably lead to counter-arguments that these protections extend Sar-
banes-Oxley beyond its original focus on corporate fraud and that any 
restriction on an employer’s ability to fire an employee will result in 
higher employer costs.303 In turn, these higher employer costs could force 
lower employee wages or higher unemployment.  Neither outcome 
would help employees as a group.304 
Recognizing these criticisms, I also suggest a less drastic alternative 
than broadening the scope of the Act.  At a minimum, the Act’s bounda-
ries should be clarified by providing employees ready information on 
protections and consequences prior to blowing the whistle.  The low 
employee success rate revealed in this study suggests that whistleblowers 
and their attorneys need more information about their chance of success 
in the administrative process.  Statistical data would provide whistle-
blowers better information with which to weigh the costs and benefits of 
blowing the whistle in the first place.   
Currently, OSHA and the Office of Administrative Law Judges 
(OALJ) maintain and publish information related to Sarbanes-Oxley 
complaints under surprisingly different standards and policies.  OSHA 
maintains statistics about the outcomes of Sarbanes-Oxley complaints and 
is willing to release them, but only in response to a specific request.305 By 
contrast, the OALJ stopped keeping and releasing statistics regarding the 
outcomes of Sarbanes-Oxley cases in April 2005.306 However, the OALJ 
publishes all ALJ decisions on its website and provides a helpful digest of 
decisions organized by topic.307 OSHA, on the other hand, requires a 
FOIA request to release individual decision-letters and does not publish 
 
302 See id. at 864 (asserting that a model whistleblower statute should focus on the 
disclosure made by the whistleblower, not the whistleblower). 
303 See generally Steven L. Willborn, Individual Employment Rights and the Standard 
Economic Objection: Theory and Empiricism, 67 NEB. L. REV. 101 (1988). 
304 See id. 
305 See E-mail from Nilgun Tolek, Director, OSHA Office of Investigative Assistance, 
to Richard Moberly, Asst. Prof. of Law, Univ. of Neb. College of Law (Oct. 5, 2006) (on file 
with author).     
306 See E-mail from Todd Smyth, Office of Administrative Law Judges, to Richard 
Moberly, Asst. Prof. of Law, Univ. of Neb. College of Law (Feb. 15, 2006) (on file with 
author). 
307 See OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT (SOX) WHISTLE-
BLOWER DIGEST, at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/WHISTLEBLOWER/ 
REFERENCES/REFEENCE_WORKS/SOX.HTM (last visited Feb. 1, 2007). 
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any summary or digest of its decisions.  Neither OSHA nor the OALJ has 
agreed to release information regarding settlements.308 
For broadest exposure, all information regarding both overall statis-
tics and individualized decisions from OSHA and the ALJs should be 
published.  Such information could appear on the internet sites for OSHA 
and the OALJ.  These websites could include running totals of the 
amounts awarded to employees and amounts received by employers 
through settlements, in addition to basic information such as the win rate 
for employees.   
If OSHA and the ALJs made these statistics readily available for Sar-
banes-Oxley cases, then the statistics may dispel popular (and possible 
administrative) opinion that the Act is overly protective of employees.  To 
the extent that administrative decision-makers view Sarbanes-Oxley cases 
with skepticism because of the Act’s potentially dramatic applicability to 
millions of employees, these decision-makers may have a tendency to 
read the Act narrowly in order to avoid a “flood” of litigants.  Statistical 
information about the overwhelming advantage employers have in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley claims process may have a substantive impact on deci-
sion-makers, who may reevaluate such inclinations.  Additionally, this 
public exposure may also expose and discipline any decision-maker bias 
toward a particular party. 
With regard to substantive, as opposed to statistical, information, 
OSHA could follow the OALJ’s lead and post its decision-letters online 
for public inspection.  OSHA also could update and publish any guidance 
it gives to its field investigators regarding OSHA’s approach to the 
unique Sarbanes-Oxley issues addressed in this Article, such as OSHA’s 
interpretation of the “covered employer” and “protected activity” re-
quirements.  Such information would allow for further public discourse 
and transparency regarding OSHA’s interpretations of these debatable 
issues. 
This information also may convince employees with marginal claims 
not to assert them.  Weak claims may have led to stronger-than-necessary 
language in decisions construing the Act narrowly.309 This narrowing 
language is problematic because of its applicability to later cases in which 
a broader interpretation might have been appropriate.  A stronger overall 
pool of employee-complainants may help convince decision-makers that 
a slightly broader view of the Act is appropriate to satisfy Sarbanes-
Oxley’s remedial aims with only a minimal risk of opening the floodgates 
for frivolous claims.   
These suggestions would impose little administrative cost on the 
government, given that these agencies already maintain much of the 
information.  Indeed, the EEOC, the other major federal administrative 
agency that processes and adjudicates employee claims, provides such 
 
308 See Letter from Richard E. Fairfax, Director of the Directorate of Enforcement 
Programs, OSHA, to Richard Moberly, Asst. Prof. of Law, Univ. of Neb. College of Law 
(Nov. 6, 2006) (on file with author). 
309 Cf. Selmi, supra note 232, at 567-68 (discussing this problem in the context of the 
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statistics on its website, demarcated by year and statute.310 Unlike OSHA, 
the EEOC also publishes a detailed Compliance Manual and updated 
Enforcement Guidances describing the standards used by the EEOC 
when evaluating various legal issues.311 
In sum, the study indicates that many employee losses resulted from 
the focus of administrative decision-makers on issues that define the legal 
boundaries of the Act.  To the extent one believes that Sarbanes-Oxley 
should apply broadly to encourage substantial numbers of corporate 
employee whistleblowers to report a wide range of misconduct, one 
response to the study’s results might be for Congress to re-define Sar-
banes-Oxley’s boundaries to more clearly include cases that the 
administrative process currently excludes.   
Of course, another view might be that Congress meant Sarbanes-
Oxley to address only the problem of corporate fraud in public compa-
nies, and the study’s results demonstrate that administrative decision-
makers appropriately enforced the narrow legal parameters of the Act.  A 
less drastic response than Congressional amendment of the Act might be 
more appropriate in this instance, such as providing more information 
publicly about the outcomes of Sarbanes-Oxley cases in order to provide 
employees realistic information about their protection, or lack thereof, 
before they decide to blow the whistle on corporate wrongdoing. 
C. Enforcing the Burden of Proof 
Unlike the unclear scope of Sarbanes-Oxley’s legal boundaries, Sar-
banes-Oxley mandates an unambiguously employee-friendly burden of 
proof for claims that fall within the Act’s protections.  As discussed 
above, employees have a low burden because the employee must only 
prove causation under a “contributing factor” test.312 Conversely, Sar-
banes-Oxley places a high burden on employers, who must prove their 
rebuttal under a “clear and convincing” standard.313 Thus, a reasonable 
expectation when the case focuses on a factual dispute would be that, 
absent significant case-selection effects, Sarbanes-Oxley should produce a 
higher-than-average win rate for employees.  Indeed, ALJ decisions met 
this expectation as employees won 66.7% of the time when “causation” 
was the issue, and 88.3% of the time when the employer was required to 
satisfy the “clear and convincing” burden of proof.314 
But, despite having every advantage regarding the burden of proof 
for causation, employees still lost at an extremely high rate at the OSHA 
Level, even when the only issue was causation. OSHA found that an em-
ployee satisfied the “contributing  factor” standard only 34.6% of the 
 
310 See EEOC, ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS AND LITIGATION, at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/enforcement.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2007) 
311 See EEOC, COMPLIANCE MANUAL, at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/ compli-
ance.html (last visited on Jan. 30, 2007); EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCES, at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/guidance.html (last visited on Jan. 30, 2007). 
312 See discussion supra Part IV.B.3. 
313 See id. 
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time.315 When the employee met this level of proof, placing a “clear and 
convincing” burden of proof on the employer still resulted in a relatively 
low employee win rate of 35.1%.316 Overall in these “factual” cases, 
employees won only 12.1% of the time at the OSHA Level, compared to 
55.6% of the time at the ALJ Level.317 
This problem presents no easy solution.  The statutory language al-
ready sets forth the favorable burden of proof for employees 
unambiguously, so further legislative change to the burden of proof 
seems unhelpful.  OSHA itself appears unable or unwilling to implement 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s employee-friendly burdens.   
To the extent OSHA is willing but unable to perform this task, Con-
gress should provide OSHA with more resources to investigate and to 
adjudicate Sarbanes-Oxley claims adequately.  A fuller investigation and 
more information from employees may increase the likelihood of em-
ployee success at the OSHA Level.  To provide a fuller investigation—one 
that is more “hearing-like”—Congress should provide OSHA subpoena 
power in its Sarbanes-Oxley investigations, similar to the authority 
OSHA employs to enforce the Occupational Safety and Health Act.318 
Additionally, OSHA should amend its regulations to provide itself more 
authority for information gathering.319 Altering OSHA’s policies and 
regulations to ensure more employee participation in the process may 
present OSHA with more complete information about the factual circum-
stances of a case.320 
For example, the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), which pro-
tects federal government employees who report waste, mismanagement, 
or wrongdoing, takes a different approach than the current OSHA regula-
tions.  When the Office of Special Counsel investigates a whistleblower’s 
complaint against a federal agency, the WPA permits the whistleblower 
to comment upon the agency’s answer to the whistleblower’s complaint 
after it is submitted to the Special Counsel.321 This statutorily-mandated 
back-and-forth exchange provides the Special Counsel with a more com-
plete picture of the factual background to the case.  Similarly, a broader 
picture may give OSHA’s investigators the proper context with which to 
 
315 See supra Table 9. 
316 See supra Table 10. 
317 See supra Table 8. 
318 See 29 U.S.C. § 657(b) (granting OSHA subpoena power when OSHA investigates 
possible safety and health problems). 
319 As part of this overhaul, OSHA also should highlight Sarbanes-Oxley’s unique 
burden of proof structure in its investigative manual and better differentiate Sarbanes-
Oxley from other whistleblower statutes OSHA administers. 
320 See Vaughn, et al., supra note 247, at 864 (asserting that a model whistleblower 
law should include provisions enabling whistleblowers to be “involved in the administra-
tive process regarding evaluation of their allegations and regarding petitions for 
protection or redress,” including being given opportunities “to respond or to provide 
additional information”).  A similar suggestion has been made recently by Professor 
Valerie J. Watnick.  See Valerie J. Watnick, Whistleblower Protections Under the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act: A Primer and a Critique, at 60 (2006), available at http://law.bepress.com/ 
expresso/eps/1822 (unpublished manuscript). 
321 See 5 U.S.C. § 1213(e)(1)(1994).   
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apply the appropriate employee-friendly burden of proof.322 In fact, in 
April 2006, OSHA amended its procedures to require that the employee 
receive “at least the substance” of the employer’s response to a Sarbanes-
Oxley complaint.323 Additionally, other evidence from the employer, or 
at least the “substance” of such evidence, “may” also be disclosed to the 
employee.324 While these changes are a substantial improvement, OSHA 
still fails to require that the employee receive the employer’s actual re-
sponse and other evidence presented by the employer, and also fails to 
unambiguously permit the employee to comment upon and respond to 
the employer’s submissions.  Without such full disclosure and opportu-
nity to participate, the employee will have a difficult time fully presenting 
a case of retaliation and responding to the employer’s version of the 
events. 
To the extent OSHA’s failure is one of will, merely increasing 
OSHA’s authority and resources may not be sufficiently drastic to re-
spond to the agency’s failure to enforce Sarbanes-Oxley adequately.  
Rather, it may be necessary to remove OSHA entirely from this role.  In 
fact, from the Act’s inception, OSHA seemed like an unlikely choice to 
investigate corporate whistleblower claims.325 Although the agency 
administers thirteen other whistleblower provisions, the type of corporate 
fraud at issue in Sarbanes-Oxley cases seems far removed from the 
worker safety and health issues addressed by many of the other statutes 
under OSHA’s purview.326 At least three other options may serve the 
Act’s, and whistleblowers’, interests better than keeping investigative 
responsibility with OSHA.   
Two of these three options entail providing more formalized hearing 
procedures to whistleblowers in the first instance, without requiring 
employees to jump through the hoops of an administrative investigation.  
First, Congress could eliminate the statutory 180-day waiting period 
before a whistleblower can file a claim in federal court.  Indeed, an early 
draft of Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower protections did not contain this 
waiting period and permitted Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblowers to file 
directly in federal court.327 At least one other anti-retaliation provision 
 
322 Cf. Vaughn, et al., supra note 247, at 864 (noting that involvement of whistleblow-
ers in the administrative process “not only reassures whistleblowers but also increases the 
efficiency of the administrative process”). 
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Years, 2005 NEW ZEALAND L. REV. 365, 371 (noting that “Congress delegated enforcement 
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limitations from 180 days to 90 days.  See S. 2010, § 7(a), CONG. REC. S1789-90 (Mar. 12, 
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that protects “financial” whistleblowers—specifically, employees of 
depository institutions and federal banks who report illegal conduct—
permits direct filing of anti-retaliation claims in federal court.328 Federal 
courts may be more willing and able to apply Sarbanes-Oxley’s shifting 
burdens of proof correctly.329 If so, then removing the 180-day waiting 
period would enable whistleblowers to avoid OSHA’s procedural unfair-
ness and choose the federal forum immediately. 
Second, if direct filing in federal courts overly burdens an already-
crowded federal docket, then employees could be permitted to bypass the 
OSHA investigation and obtain an ALJ hearing directly.  ALJs currently 
review Sarbanes-Oxley cases de novo after an OSHA investigation and 
without deference to OSHA’s determinations.330 To the extent OSHA 
currently filters cases with little or no merit, ALJs could perform this 
same function with Orders to Show Cause, Motions to Dismiss and Mo-
tions for Summary Judgment.  Indeed, the study demonstrates that ALJs 
regularly decided cases based on pre-hearing legal arguments regarding 
the applicability of Sarbanes-Oxley to an employee’s claims.331 The ad-
vantage of sending cases directly to the Office of Administrative Law 
Judges would be that, when the facts are in dispute, ALJs have demon-
strated the ability and willingness to apply the burdens of proof in the 
employee-friendly manner in which Congress intended.332
Finally, to the extent an initial administrative investigation has value, 
shifting initial investigative responsibility to a different administrative 
agency represents a third option.  One possible alternative investigatory 
body is the SEC.  A whistleblower investigation by the SEC, with its on-
going concern for corporate fraud, may better deter corporate fraud than 
the threat of any other agency investigation.  Through Sarbanes-Oxley 
investigations, the SEC may learn information that could lead to charges 
of securities fraud against companies or individual officers, which would 
have much greater deterrence value than the typical whistleblower inves-
tigation of an employee complaint.  In fact, any violation of Sarbanes-
Oxley, presumably including the Act’s whistleblower provision, already 
should be considered a violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
with penalties of up to $1,000,000 in fines and ten years in prison.333 
328 See Financial Institutions Reform, Recover, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 12 
U.S.C. § 1831j (2001). 
329 To determine the accuracy of this speculation, I currently am collecting and ana-
lyzing Sarbanes-Oxley cases filed in federal courts. 
330 See 18 C.F.R. § 1980.107(b) (2006). 
331 The study found that ALJs decided 67 of 93 cases (72.0%) without a factual hear-
ing, based primarily on motion practice.  A complete table setting forth the results 
regarding the resolution of ALJ cases by hearing or motion can be found on the author’s 
website:  http://law.unl.edu/inside.asp?d=faculty&id=28. 
332 It must be remembered, however, that only 9 cases made it to the “causation” 
stage of an ALJ’s decision-making process.  Thus, if this suggestion were adopted, then it 
would be important to address the ALJ’s fixation on the Act’s procedural and legal 
boundaries, as discussed in the prior two sub-Parts.  See discussion supra Parts V.A. & V.B. 
333 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 3(d) (stating that “a violation by any person of 
th[e Sarbanes-Oxley] Act . . . shall be treated for all purposes in the same manner as a 
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the same penalties, and to the same extent, as for a violation of that Act”); Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff. 
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Although not currently enforced in this manner, placing the SEC in 
charge of whistleblower investigations might encourage the agency to 
request that the Department of Justice utilize this additional enforcement 
mechanism to deter retaliation against whistleblowers.  In short, the SEC 
seems like a natural choice to investigate claims related to shareholder 
fraud.  
However, this suggestion presents the risk that the SEC may be just 
as unsympathetic to whistleblowers as OSHA.  Since the Act’s enactment, 
the SEC has shown little or no interest in whistleblower claims.  Even 
though the SEC receives summaries of whistleblower allegations filed 
with OSHA,334 the SEC has not publicly recommended that the Depart-
ment of Justice investigate any person accused of retaliating against a 
whistleblower.  In 2004, two U.S. Senators formally requested that the 
SEC explain whether the SEC intended to use its authority to file civil 
enforcement actions for violations of Sarbanes-Oxley in order to enforce 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s anti-retaliation provisions.335 The Chairman of the SEC 
responded that the SEC puts its resources towards “substantive” viola-
tions of securities laws and therefore would leave Sarbanes-Oxley anti-
retaliation enforcement to the Department of Labor.336 Yet, despite this 
apparent reluctance to become involved with whistleblowers, a formal 
Congressional mandate for the SEC to enforce Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistle-
blower provisions may motivate the agency, particularly if whistleblower 
investigations unveil “substantive” violations of other securities laws. 
Any of these options could provide better protection for employees 
than maintaining the status quo, which likely fails to adequately deter 
retaliation against whistleblowers.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
This study suggests that Sarbanes-Oxley fails to protect employee 
whistleblowers as Congress originally intended.  The unfulfilled expecta-
tions of employees regarding the Act’s potential protections have led to a 
surprisingly low win rate in claims adjudicated administratively under 
the Act.  In particular, two discrepancies between employee expectation 
and administrative implementation contributed to the low win rate for 
employees throughout Sarbanes-Oxley’s administrative process.   
First, OSHA and the ALJs typically found for the employer because 
the employee failed to satisfy the Act’s legal hurdles.  During the initial 
years of the Act’s implementation, employees may have brought claims 
that pushed the boundaries of the Act.  Administrative decision-makers 
responded by narrowly interpreting the Act’s provisions, particularly 
with regard to the procedural bar of the statute of limitations and the 
boundary requirements of a prima facie case, including the “covered 
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employer” and “protected activity” elements.  Because most Sarbanes-
Oxley cases were resolved through the resolution of legal issues, the 
factual merits of a whistleblower’s allegation were rarely adjudicated. 
Second, in the instances when these factual allegations were ad-
dressed, OSHA tended to apply the Act’s employee-friendly burden of 
proof inappropriately.  In these cases, OSHA consistently found for the 
employer, even when the only issue was whether the employer satisfied a 
“clear and convincing” burden of proof. 
To address these issues, Congress could make several changes to the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  To redress the unfair burdens the Act’s short statute 
of limitations imposes on employees, Congress could lengthen the limita-
tions period from 90 to at least 180 days, which would comport with 
statute of limitations found in other employment statutes. 
Additionally, to curb the rigid application of the Act’s “boundaries,” 
Congress could consider extending the Act’s coverage to protect more 
types of whistleblowers.  This statutory amendment could address areas 
on which OSHA and the ALJs appear to focus: the “covered employer” 
requirement and the “protected activity” requirement.  Clarifying and 
increasing the scope of the Act’s coverage would protect employees who 
report wrongdoing, but work for the wrong “type” of company or report 
the wrong “type” of misconduct.  Alternatively, Congress could require 
that OSHA and the ALJs publicize and report the types of findings they 
make in order to better inform the public of the limitations of their deci-
sion-making. 
Finally, to address OSHA’s apparent misapplication of the Act’s 
burden of proof, Congress and OSHA could provide employees more 
influence and participation in the investigative process, enabling OSHA 
to consider both sides of the dispute more fully.  To supplement this 
suggestion, Congress should provide OSHA more resources to enable the 
agency to comprehensively and competently administer the increased 
load of Sarbanes-Oxley cases.  Alternatively, Congress could consider 
removing OSHA as the primary investigator of Sarbanes-Oxley com-
plaints.  Other options are available: Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblowers 
could file directly in federal court or with an ALJ; or, another agency such 
as the SEC might be able to apply the statute more appropriately. 
The recent corporate scandals powerfully reinforced the notion that 
employees are uniquely positioned to identify and to report corporate 
misconduct.337 Employees’ internal placement in the corporate structure 
often provides them with better information about wrongdoing than 
external corporate monitors, such as the government or outside attorneys 
and accountants.338 This monitoring can only be effective, however, if the 
law protects whistleblowers from retaliation.  Employees will report 
wrongdoing less frequently unless they are given credible assurances that 
they are safe from retaliation.  Unfortunately, during the first years of its 
existence, Sarbanes-Oxley has not sufficiently protected whistleblowers 
and thus cannot provide such assurances.  As a result, Sarbanes-Oxley 
requires further Congressional and administrative scrutiny in order to 
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fulfill Congress’ and employees’ expectation that whistleblowers will be 
protected from retaliation for blowing the whistle on corporate malfea-
sance.   
